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I. INTRODUCTION
Following his historic transatlantic journey and successfully landing his 
Spirit of St. Louis single-engine airplane in Paris on May 21, 1927, Charles 
Lindbergh became an instant celebrity, the recipient of intense media focus,
the subject of overwhelming public attention, and even an American icon.1 
The harrowing flight, the plane named after the jewel of the Louisiana 
Purchase but constructed on the wharfs of San Diego,2 and—most especially 
—the pilot captured the world’s attention and inspired the country.  
American and European newspapers reported extensively on Lindbergh 
Further, the author appreciates the assistance, efforts and generosity of Editors Jessica
Howard, Melanie Ryan, Kelly Reis, their fellow Editors and the staff members of 
the distinguished San Diego Law Review. The author also acknowledges the personally 
complex and most inspiring Charles Lindbergh who still remains a fascinating story, even 
ninety-two years after his historic, transatlantic flight.  Thank you. 
Finally, this work is dedicated to the memory of my grandfathers, Felix C. Cathcart, who
worked diligently as a U.S. naval contractor focusing on the safety of airplane construction, and
Charles G. Clark, who faithfully delivered the U.S. mail by rail to all corners of the 
country, when these historical events culminating in the Air Mail Affair simultaneously 
unfolded from the halls of Congress to the skies above.  Ad astra per aspera. 
1. The Flight, CHARLES LINDBERGH, http://www.charleslindbergh.com/history/paris.asp 
[https://perma.cc/7B6X-3M64].
2.  The Spirit of St. Louis, CHARLES LINDBERGH, http://www.charleslindbergh. 
com/plane/index.asp [https://perma.cc/2QAH-FDGX]. 
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and his activities for decades, filling their pages with everything from
laudable triumph to personal tragedy.  And, among his subsequent, multiple 
pursuits, Charles Lindbergh even defied a U.S. President.3 
On February 9, 1934, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive 
Order 6591, directing the U.S. Army Air Corps (Air Corps) to assume 
responsibility for transporting the airmail effective February 19, 1934.4 
On the same day Roosevelt entered his order, Postmaster General James
A. Farley canceled all airmail contracts with the private airlines.5 The result
was disastrous.6  Among other challenges, the Air Corps suffered from
under-equipped aircrafts, and pilots who were unfamiliar with flying at
night and unaccustomed to flying in inclement weather.7  While transporting
the mail in just the first few short months, the Air Corps suffered twelve 
pilot fatalities and sixty-six crashes.8 
Seven years after his historic flight, Lindbergh remained involved in the 
airline industry, working at then Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc.9 
He was, perhaps, the most vocal, high-profile, and persuasive critic of
Roosevelt’s executive action to remove the commercial airlines from mail 
delivery.10  Among other criticisms, Lindbergh argued Roosevelt unjustly
denied “due process” to the air carriers by unilaterally canceling the contracts,11 
and he further warned that the ill-advised action gravely threatened the
viability of the nascent airline industry.12 
Roosevelt contended his action was necessary, alleging that the previous
Postmaster General of the Hoover administration, Walter F. Brown, “abuse[d] 
his power” and steered the airmail contracts to some of the major airlines
following a series of public meetings or conferences occurring between
3. A. SCOTT BERG, LINDBERGH 292 (1998). 
4. Exec. Order No. 6591: The Army Temporarily Flies the Mail, 3 PUB. PAPERS
93 (Feb. 9, 1934). 
5. William E. Berchtold, The Air Mail Affair: A Critical Appraisal of the Administration’s 
Recent Blunder, with Suggestions for the Formulation of a Sound and Permanent Air 
Policy, 237 N. AM. REV. 438, 438 (1934). 
6. See generally Edward Rubin, The Regulatizing Process and the Boundaries of 
New Public Governance, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 535, 571. 
7. JOHN L. FRISBEE, MAKERS OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE 50 (1987). 
8. Id.; Rubin, supra note 6, at 571. 
9. BERG, supra note 3, at 292. 
10. Kenneth P. Werrell, “Fiasco” Revisited: The Air Corps & the 1934 Air Mail 
Episode, AIR POWER HIST., Spring 2010, at 12, 17. 
11. CONRAD BLACK, FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT: CHAMPION OF FREEDOM 321 
(1st ed. 2003). 
12. See BERG, supra note 3, at 292. 
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May and June 1930.13  Critics later labeled these Brown meetings with the 
airline representatives as the “spoils conferences.”14  Following the change in
political power to a Democratic controlled legislature in 1932, Senator 
Hugo Black (D-Ala.) and Congress launched an investigation into how 
Brown awarded the contracts to the various airlines,15 which became known 
as the “Air Mail Scandal.”16 
This issue dominated the news headlines during 1934 with newspapers 
reporting every development, including congressional hearings, the Air 
Corps pilot fatalities, and the very public feud between Roosevelt and 
Lindbergh.17  By March 10, 1934, Roosevelt backed down, ended the Air
Corps operation, and allowed the commercial airlines to resume airmail 
service under new contracts.18  Subsequently, Roosevelt also pushed the new 
Congress to enact different legislation,19 which heavily regulated the airline
industry and changed the fee structure.20  President Roosevelt signed the
Air Mail Act of 1934, or the Black-McKellar Act, into law on June 12, 1934.21 
Although Roosevelt and his Postmaster General, James Farley, reinstituted 
commercial airmail service within a few short months, several of the airlines
affected by the Executive order filed suit.22  The outcome unfolded several
years later on December 7, 1942, when the United States Court of Claims 
held in Pacific Air Transport v. United States that Postmaster General 
Farley justifiably annulled the airmail contracts negotiated by former 
13.  Justin T. Barkowski, Comment, Managing Air Traffic Congestion Through the
Next Generation Air Transportation System: Satellite-Based Technology, Trajectories, and—
Privatization?, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 247, 255 (2010); Grant Cates, Airmail and the Evolution of the 
U.S. Aviation Industry in the 1920s and 1930s: A Potential Model for the Space Industry 
in the Next Millennium, Paper Session at the 37th Space Means Business in the 21st 
Century Conference, in  SPACE CONGRESS  PROC. (May 2, 2000), https://commons.erau.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1207&context=space-congress-proceedings [https://perma.cc/
YC3Y-EQD5].
14. Barkowski, supra note 13, at 255. 
15. Paul M. Godehn & Frank E. Quindry, Air Mail Contract Cancellations of 1934
and Resulting Litigation, 21 J. AIR L. & COM. 253, 254 (1954); Black, Hugo Lafayette, (1886– 
1971), BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY U.S. CONGRESS, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/
biodisplay.pl?index=B000499 [https://perma.cc/LN5W-M5BQ].
16. Barkowski, supra note 13, at 255. 
17. Werrell, supra note 10, at 14. 
18. Justin H. Libby, Comments on the Air Mail Episode of 1934, AIR POWER HIST.,
Summer 2010, at 44, 46. 
19. Berchtold, supra note 5, at 438; Rubin, supra note 6, at 571–72. 
20. See Timothy M. Ravich, National Airline Policy, 23 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1,
7 (2014).
21. BLACK, supra note 11, at 322; The Air Mail Act of 1934, AVSTOP.COM, http://avstop.
com/history/needregulations/act1934.htm [https://perma.cc/MBV6-SNYB].
22. Government Maps Defense as TWA Sues on Air Mail, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 
1934, at A1, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1934/02/14/issue.html [https:// 
perma.cc/928G-6EXF]. 
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Postmaster General Brown, but the commercial airlines were entitled to 
payment withheld by Roosevelt and Farley for the airmail services provided
in January and February 1934.23 
After consulting available case law from this time period, this Article 
analyzes the Pacific Air decision and specifically considers whether the 
President violated the separation of powers and offended due process as
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution when he abruptly canceled the airmail
contracts. In short, is President Roosevelt’s Executive Order 6591 an 
example of impermissible executive overreach?
Initially, this analysis considers the facts and circumstances occurring 
before and during 1934, while tracing the historical narrative that unfolds 
into the controversial Air Mail Affair and ultimately influences the Pacific 
Air holding.  While recognizing the Court of Claims’s decision, this Article
then investigates alternative arguments available to the commercial airlines 
that could have shaped the judicial opinion but the court failed to address.
Specifically, this analysis considers whether President Roosevelt undermined 
the constitutionally guaranteed separation of powers when he invalidated the 
airmail contracts on February 9, 1934. The U.S. Constitution delegates mail
delivery as a congressional responsibility.24  Additionally, Congress did not
authorize the Secretary of War and the Air Corps to provide assistance 
with mail transportation when Roosevelt entered his Executive order.  Later, 
Congress enacted legislation authorizing this action but not until March
27, 1934.25 
Next, this analysis considers whether Roosevelt and the government 
violated due process of law, specifically “condemn[ed] the largest portion 
of our commercial aviation without just trial. . . . [and without] the opportunity 
of a hearing” by canceling the contracts, as Charles Lindbergh contended.26 
When canceling an airmail contract or a route certificate, the government
was required to provide the airlines with written notice and a forty-five-
day period to respond.27  However, Roosevelt and Farley failed to comply 
with the notice and hearing provisions28 and abruptly transferred the
23.  Pac. Air Transp. v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 649, 649, 789–90 (1942). 
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7. 
25. See generally Act of Mar. 27, 1934, ch. 100, § 1, 48 Stat. 508, 508. 
26. Libby, supra note 18, at 45. 
27. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 660. 
28. See id. at 655–60. 
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airmail responsibility to the Air Corps instead.29  When justifying this, 
Roosevelt and Farley contended that the airlines participating in Brown’s 
spoils conferences successfully conspired to prevent other airlines from 
bidding on airmail route contracts, which violated § 3950 of the Revised 
Statutes of the United States, or R.S. 3950.30  Under this statute, any
violation permitted the Postmaster General to “annul” the airmail contract 
without notice and hearing, and the carrier was banned from participating 
in any future governmental contract for a period of five years following 
the first offense.31 
The Pacific Air court decision did not consider these issues.32 
Significantly, another court addressed the airline’s due process argument 
in another case33 preceding the 1942 Pacific Air decision.  In Boeing Air
Transport, Inc. v. Farley, another aggrieved airline from the Air Mail 
Affair filed suit, similarly complaining about the President and the Postmaster 
General canceling its airmail contract without notice and hearing.34 The
U.S. Court of Appeals granted defendant Farley’s motion to dismiss after 
finding that proper jurisdiction rested with the U.S. Court of Claims, but 
not before opining the airline deserved notice and a hearing  prior to the 
defendant canceling the contracts.35 
Also gleaned from this time period, additional case law illustrates the 
potential for Executive orders to undermine constitutionally guaranteed
separation of powers.36  Although decided a decade earlier, United States 
v. Pan-American Petroleum Co. shares very similar factual circumstances
with the Air Mail Affair.37  In Pan-American Petroleum, a federal district 
court invalidated a governmental contract with an oil company due to the 
fraudulent conduct of the Secretary of the Interior and because President 
Harding’s Executive order usurps congressional powers by wrongfully 
transferring managerial authority over the naval petroleum reserves.38 
After applying the relevant case law, consulting journal and law review 
articles, and identifying the relevant statutes, this Article’s objective 
29. Exec. Order No. 6591: The Army Temporarily Flies the Mail, 3 PUB. PAPERS
93, 93 (Feb. 9, 1934). 
30. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 767 (citing Rev. Stat. § 3950 (1872) (codified as 
amended at 39 U.S.C. § 6421 (repealed 1970))). 
31. Id. at 745 (citing Rev. Stat. § 3950). 
32. See id. 654. 
33. Boeing Air Transp., Inc. v. Farley, 75 F.2d 765, 765–67 (D.C. Cir. 1935). 
34. Id. at 767. 
35. Id. at 768. 
36. See, e.g., United States v. Pan-Am. Petrol. Co., 6 F.2d 43, 87–88 (S.D. Cal. 
1925), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 9 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1926), aff’d, 273 U.S. 456 
(1927).
37. See id. at 53. 
38. Id. at 87. 
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analysis concludes that President Roosevelt’s Executive Order 6591 
wrongfully extended into the responsibility of another branch of government 
and violated separation of powers.  The U.S. Constitution assigns the postal 
duty as a congressional responsibility under Article One, Section Eight.39 
Over time, Congress delegated some postal functions to the Postmaster 
General.40  Although the President appoints the Postmaster General, Roosevelt 
wrongfully substituted his authority for the Postmaster General’s authority 
when he entered the Executive order, assigning mail delivery to the Air Corps 
and effectively canceling the airmail contracts.  In doing so, he essentially 
interfered in the postal responsibility that Congress delegated to the 
Postmaster General. 
Coming close to addressing the due process argument, but without doing
so, the Pacific Air court implied that the contractual language requiring 
written notice and a forty-five-day hearing opportunity is inapplicable 
because the court found a violation of federal statute § 3950, which 
prohibits interference in the bidding process.41 Significantly, the written 
notice and forty-five-day hearing requirements are both specified in the 
airline contracts, or route certificates, as well as in the congressionally enacted 
McNary-Watres Act.42  The court’s reasoning conflicts with the Boeing 
Air decision, where that court held that a notice and hearing requirement 
is implied in the applicable federal statute, § 3950.43  Unrelated to the
McNary-Watres legislation requiring written notice and a forty-five-day 
hearing opportunity, § 3950 prohibits bid interference and addresses 
the penalties but lacks specific notice and hearing language.44  Despite
this, the Boeing Air court held that a due process right is “read” into § 3950.45 
Finally, additional case law from this time period reinforces the Boeing 
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7. 
40. See Ware v. United States, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 617, 632 (1867) (citing Act of Mar.
3, 1825, ch. 64, 4 Stat. 102). 
41.  Pac. Air Transp. v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 649, 789–90 (1942). 
42. Id. at 656 (citing McNary-Watres Act, ch. 223, sec. 2, § 6, 46 Stat. 259, 260 
(1930)).
43. Rev. Stat. § 3950 (1872) (codified as amended at 39 U.S.C. § 6421 (repealed
1970)); Boeing Air Transp., Inc. v. Farley, 75 F.2d 765, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1935). 
44.  Rev. Stat. § 3950. 
45. Boeing Air Transp., 75 F.2d at 767. 
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Air court reasoning about the unconstitutionality of denying the airlines
notice and hearing opportunities.46 
Admittedly, the facts and circumstances culminating in the Pacific Air
decision occurred decades ago, but the issues involving this decision remain 
relevant today as courts continue to grapple with allegations of government
overreach, using the Executive order as a method to usurp legislative authority, 
and the scope of constitutional protections.  Years later, Lindbergh’s warning 
about government’s intrusion echoes as distinctly as the steady hum 
emanating from his single-engine monoplane as it conquered the Atlantic 
and advanced toward the European horizon on May 21, 1927.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
A reasonable amount of literature addresses the Air Mail Affair and its 
aftermath as it unfolded in front of the nation in 1934.  In public hearings,
a Senate committee investigated former Postmaster General Brown after
he awarded various airmail contracts, certificates, and route extensions
following a series of meetings with airline executives.47  The Senate
investigation, Roosevelt’s very public dispute with Lindbergh, and the 
death of Air Corps pilots fueled the public’s interest, prompting intense 
media attention.48  The newspapers wrote extensively about the issue as it
developed from airfields to the halls of Congress.49  In fact, most major 
newspapers printed “a story on the subject half of the days in February 
and March” and dedicated 30% of this coverage to the front page.50  In
addition to the newspaper attention, additional writers also pursued this 
topic, making it the subject matter of various commercial magazines, textbooks, 
and even academic journals. 
On May 15, 1918, Congress approved funding for the first experimental 
airmail route between New York and Washington, D.C.51  Multiple pieces
of legislation influenced and shaped the issue over the years, continuing 
with the Kelly Act of 1925 through the Air Mail Act of 1934.52  Much of
this legislation is broad and far-reaching, addressing both the Postal Service 
and the airline industry, which was in its infancy.53  Over the years, various
46. See, e.g., Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 589–90
(1935); Ochoa v. Hernandez y Morales, 230 U.S. 139, 161 (1913); Marchant v. Pa. R.R. 
Co., 153 U.S. 380, 386–87 (1894). 
47. See S. Res. 349, 72d Cong. (1933) (enacted). 
48. Werrell, supra note 10, at 20. 
49. Id.
 50. Id.
51.  Pac. Air Transp. v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 649, 677 (1942). 
52. Act of Mar. 27, 1934, ch. 100, 48 Stat. 508; Kelly Act, ch. 128, 43 Stat. 805
(1925).
53. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 27, 1934, 48 Stat. 508; Kelly Act, 43 Stat. 805. 
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authorities evaluated this legislation and considered its impact on various 
public priorities, especially postal delivery and airline regulation.  This
Article attempts to identify, collect, and analyze these factors to gain a
broad perspective and more acute understanding of the issues and history
affecting the Air Mail Affair.
Conversely, only a limited amount of material discusses the critical 
judicial opinion, Pacific Air.54  Interestingly enough, the holding conflicted 
with other judicial opinions involving the Air Mail Affair—further clouding 
the outcome.  Initially, a commissioner heard Pacific Air and found contrary 
to the U.S. Court of Claims on some issues.55  Commissioner Richard H.
Akers agreed that Farley justifiably nullified the airmail contracts; he found 
that the airlines secured the route certificates through an open bidding 
procedure, and the evidence failed to corroborate the government’s assertion 
that the plaintiff airlines received these contracts through fraud or collusion.56 
Commissioner Akers made his decision and entered his findings on July
14, 1941,57 and the U.S. Court of Claims ultimately decided the case on
December 7, 1942, several years after the Air Mail Affair concluded.58 
Significantly, another noteworthy decision preceded Pacific Air, where 
a different court agreed with the airline’s due process claim before granting 
the government’s motion to dismiss for jurisdictional reasons.59  However, 
the Pacific Air decision received anemic attention in the literature, 
commentary, and legal analysis,60 especially when comparing the court 
54.  98 Ct. Cl. 649. 
55. Godehn & Quindry, supra note 15, at 272.  Commissioner Richard Akers heard and
ruled on the case before the U.S. Court of Claims.  Id. at 259.  The evidence spanned 
a cumulative sixty-three days between April 26, 1938 and June 11, 1940, when he heard 
testimony from a significant number of witnesses in three different locations: Washington, 
D.C., Sanford, North Carolina, and Los Angeles, California.  Id.  Ultimately, he received 
more than 769 exhibits into evidence.  Id. 
 56. Id. at 271. 
57. Id. at 261. 
58. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 649. 
59.  Boeing Air Transp., Inc. v. Farley, 75 F.2d 765, 767–68 (D.C. Cir. 1935). 
60. Research identified few articles addressing Pacific Air or the litigation involving the
Air Mail Affair.  Paul Godehn and Frank Quindry reported the U.S. Court of Claims 
finding that the plaintiff airlines violated the federal statute, which contradicts the findings of 
the commissioner who initially heard the case.  Godehn & Quindry, supra note 15, at 
261, 271–72.  Likewise, Kenneth Werrell agreed the court concluded that the airlines 
colluded to avoid an open bidding process.  Werrell, supra note 10, at 22.  Finally, 
Benjamin Lipsner solely reported on Commissioner Akers’ findings that the airlines did 
not obstruct the bidding process; however, he does not report that the U.S. Court of Claims 
 69
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decision to the more voluminous amount of literature discussing the Air 
Mail Affair.  As an additional resource, case law from this time period 
addresses separation of powers as well as due process issues. This case
law assists with understanding how these arguments apply to the Pacific 
Air holding.
The Pacific Air holding was the last word on a controversial issue. 
However, the court failed to evaluate the separation of powers or the due
process arguments in this lengthy 148-page decision.61  While it acknowledged
the government did not comply with the notice provisions when annulling 
the airmail contracts, the court remained silent about a Fifth Amendment 
due process violation.62  Likewise, the decision failed to address the 
executive action and whether this branch exceeded its authority.63  This
analysis evaluates these twin arguments and how they apply to the holding 
affecting such a historic issue. 
III. METHODOLOGY
This is not an empirical study.  This Article utilizes the multiple available
resources to consider alternative arguments available to the plaintiff airlines 
in Pacific Air when pursuing their cause of action against the federal
government. This analysis initially discusses the history affecting the Air
Mail Affair and how these circumstances shape the Pacific Air holding.
In deference to the U.S. Court of Claims’s decision, this Article next 
investigates alternative arguments available to the plaintiffs that the Pacific 
Air court failed to consider. 
After consulting different journal articles, law review articles, and relevant
case law, this analysis compares and contrasts these materials to the Pacific 
Air holding. Boeing Air Transport, Inc. v. Farley is especially relevant, 
illustrating the significance of the due process issue.64  Recognizing that
plaintiff National Air Transport Company is a similarly aggrieved party 
whose airmail contract is set aside, the court comments on the due process 
argument before granting relief in favor of the government.65  Although
this decision occurred years before Pacific Air was finalized, the due process 
argument for whatever reason does not filter into the later court’s evaluation.66 
Although the Boeing Air court dismissed the airline’s petition solely for 
reversed the commissioner’s decision. BENJAMIN B. LIPSNER, THE AIRMAIL JENNIES TO
JETS 253 (Jeannette Elder & Linton J. Keith eds., 1951). 
61. See generally Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. 649. 
62. See id. at 746. 
63. See generally Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. 649. 
64.  75 F.2d at 765–67. 
65. See id. at 767–68. 
66. See generally Boeing Air Transp., 75 F.2d 649. 
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jurisdictional reasons, it identified the due process concerns initially raised by
Lindbergh and serves as a valuable resource for this evaluation.67 
Similarly, case law from this time period assists with analyzing the
separation of powers issue. United States v. Pan-American Petroleum Co.
is analogous to the Air Mail Affair, although the court decided this matter 
a decade before the Air Mail Affair unfolded.68 This holding offers a
thoughtful analysis and thorough discussion about the potential for the 
Executive order to intrude into the purview of another branch of government.69 
Based on this collective evaluation, this analysis found President Roosevelt 
violated separation of powers by intruding into the legislative domain as
well as violated the airlines’ due process rights by denying them notice and 
an opportunity to be heard when canceling their contracts.  Further findings
justify the government acting within the constitutional framework, granting 
citizens and businesses alike the opportunity to be heard and allowing an 
early developing industry the opportunity to grow without governmental 
interference and, assuming adequate regulatory provisions exist, only
reluctantly interfering in its progress.  Recognizing that economic success 
fuels a country,70 the government that interferes least governs best. 
IV. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE AIR MAIL AFFAIR
A dynamic history affected the unfolding events of 1934.  For several 
years following the First World War, mail delivery was the primary source
of income for commercial aviation.71  During these early years of aviation,
passenger travel was less lucrative, so the airlines relied heavily on the 
federal airmail subsidies for their fiscal livelihood.72  It was not until 1936
that passenger travel income exceeded the income from airmail subsidies.73 
67. Id. at 767–68. 
68. United States v. Pan-Am. Petrol. Co., 6 F.2d 43 (S.D. Cal. 1925), aff’d in part
and rev’d in part, 9 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1926), aff’d, 273 U.S. 456 (1927). 
69. See id. at 87. 
70. Many authorities recognize the economic importance of a country’s standing,
including those identified in Thomas C. Clark, Impact of Nineteenth Century Missouri Courts 
upon Emerging Industry: Chambers of Commerce or Chambers of Justice?, authored 
by a different Hon. Thomas C. Clark.  Thomas C. Clark, Impact of Nineteenth Century 
Missouri Courts upon Emerging Industry: Chambers of Commerce or Chambers of 
Justice?, 63 MO. L. REV. 51, 51–52 (1998). 
71. Rubin, supra note 6, at 568. 
72. See Werrell, supra note 10, at 15. 
73. Ravich, supra note 20, at 7–8. 
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During the years preceding the Air Mail Affair, Congress passed multiple 
pieces of legislation and different Presidential administrations attempted
to influence airline development. In 1925, Congress enacted the Contract
Air Mail Act, or the Kelly Act,74 authorizing the Postmaster General75 to 
privatize the airmail service, create the different airmail routes, and award 
those contracts to the lowest bidder.76  After the carrier demonstrated 
dependability, the Postmaster General could exchange the carrier’s airmail 
contract for a route certificate for a longer period but not to exceed ten 
years.77 
Recognizing the value of the aviation industry and its economic potential, 
Congress next enacted the Air Commerce Act in 1926.78  This subsequent
legislation authorized the Secretary of Commerce to further develop the 
economic potential of the nascent airline industry.79  Then, during the Hoover
administration, Congress passed the Air Mail Act of 1930.80  Also known 
as the McNary-Watres Act, this legislation empowered then-Postmaster 
General Walter Brown to award airmail routes to the lowest bidder transporting 
the mail based on a space-mileage basis, not the mail weight.81  This new 
compensation method provided the airlines with a stimulus to transport 
passengers as well as the mail.82  Congress intended McNary-Watres to 
stabilize the industry and steer the more experienced airlines toward financial 
independence and away from the traditional, steady diet of federal 
subsidies.83 
74.  Kelly Act, ch. 128, 43 Stat. 805 (1925); Cates, supra note 13, at 1.  As the namesake 
of the legislation, Representative Clyde Kelly (R-Pa.) is recognized as the father of 
the airmail system.  Berchtold, supra note 5, at 442. 
75.  The Postmaster General selection process evolved through history.  Originally, the
President nominated an individual who was subject to Senate approval for this cabinet-
level appointment.  Ware v. United States, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 617, 633 (1867).  In 1971, 
Congress removed the Postmaster General as a cabinet-level position and reformed the 
selection process.  U.S. Postmasters General, SMITHSONIAN NAT’L POSTAL MUSEUM, https:// 
postalmuseum.si.edu/research/topical-reference-pages/postmasters-general.html [https://
perma.cc/BC7A-CNCS].  Instead of Presidential appointment, the Postmaster General is 
elected by the Board of Governors of the United States Postal Service. Id. 
76. Barkowski, supra note 13, at 253. 
77. Pac. Air Transp. v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 649, 656 (1942) (citing McNary-
Watres Act, ch. 223, § 6, 46 Stat. 259, 259–60 (1930)). 
78. Barkowski, supra note 13, at 254 (citing Air Commerce Act of 1926, ch. 344,
44 Stat. 568)). 
79. See id. at 254–55. 
80. Ravich, supra note 20, at 7 (citing McNary-Watres Act § 4, 46 Stat. 259). 
81. H.R. Res. 107, 85th Cong. (1957) (enacted). With this payment change, airlines
were no longer subsidized based on the collective weight of the mail transported.  Id.; 
Ravich, supra note 20, at 7. 
82.  H.R. Res. 107. 
83. See Berchtold, supra note 5, at 441, 445. 
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The McNary-Watres Act empowered Brown.  He used his influence to
improve the efficiency of the airmail service as the overall cost to transport 
the mail decreased from $1.09 per mile in 1929 to $0.38 per mile in 1933.84 
Under this legislation, he extended several airmail routes, hoping to inspire 
the airlines to expand passenger service while consolidating the airline
industry into a more manageable entity.85  Prior to McNary-Watres, the existing
airmail routes reflected a haphazard system—a patchwork of “illogical lines” 
stemming from only one transcontinental route.86  Pursuant to his authority
under McNary-Watres, Brown bolstered both the airmail and passenger 
service by redesigning the airmail map, reconfiguring the north to south routes, 
and, perhaps most importantly, adding two east to west transcontinental 
87 routes.
On May 19, 1930, Brown met with some of the airline executives to discuss
the recently enacted McNary-Watres legislation, his proposed route extensions, 
as well as an additional two “independent and competing” transcontinental 
routes that the Postmaster General especially favored.88  The post office
disclosed this event to the public and distributed a press release, announcing 
the meeting and specifically identifying, by name, the participating passenger 
and airmail carriers.89 
At the meeting, Brown encouraged the airline executives to meet, discuss, 
and decide among themselves which airlines could effectively service the 
newly proposed airmail routes.90  When entering its decision years after these
events, the Court of Claims found that Brown told the airlines that he was 
not obligated to implement their proposals but “he desired suggestions and 
recommendations as to whether [the airlines] could agree on the operator 
who should perform the service in a given area and that he would give most 
careful consideration to their suggestions and recommendations.”91 
Later, critics labeled the airline executive meetings, both with and without
Brown, as the spoils conferences.92 Under Brown’s approach, he hoped to 
extend the carrier routes under the existing contracts but without advertising 
84. Id. at 445. 
85. Rubin, supra note 6, at 569–71. 
86.  Pac. Air Transp. v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 649, 700 (1942). 
87. Id.
 88. Godehn & Quindry, supra note 15, at 262–63; see Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. 
at 700. 
89. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 698–99. 
90. See id. at 701. 
91. Id. at 702. 
92. Barkowski, supra note 13, at 255; Rubin, supra note 6, at 571. 
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for competing bids.93  Brown recognized that some operators were more 
experienced, safe, and fiscally sound than others,94 and he undoubtedly feared 
advertising would prompt bids from incapable providers or “irresponsible 
bidders.”95  In his estimation, a successful restructuring necessitated some
of the multiple, smaller companies to consolidate or merge into a fewer 
number of larger, more manageable airlines equally qualified to expand 
passenger travel.96 
On June 4, 1930, the airlines reported to Brown in writing that they
agreed on air carriers for seven of the twelve routes Brown proposed but 
did not agree on a carrier for the remaining, more highly contested airmail
lines, including the two additional transcontinental routes.97  Brown was 
disappointed that the airlines were unable to agree on service providers 
for the “longer and more controversial” routes and could only agree on the 
shorter, less significant routes, which prompted Brown to act.98 
Consequently, Brown created and allocated the two transcontinental
airmail routes supplementing the sole transcontinental route operated by 
United at the time.99  Pursuant to his plan to establish three independently 
operated transcontinental routes, Brown awarded Aviation Corporation 
with the southern route between Atlanta and Los Angeles, and he awarded 
Transcontinental & Western Air, following their merger, with the central 
route between New York and Los Angeles and through St. Louis.100 
Under Brown’s direction, the restructured aviation industry thrived and
the amount of passenger travel tripled in the next few years.101  Although 
later congressional hearings revealed that Brown was sometimes autocratic 
and arbitrary, his vision and leadership elevated the U.S. air transportation 
system to the best in the world, all while the country was experiencing the 
economic turmoil of the Great Depression.102 
As 1932 unfolded, much of the country was experiencing deep economic 
hardship as the Great Depression continued, but the fall election marked 
a sea change in political power as the Democrats replaced the Republicans 
in the White House and both houses of Congress.103  Roosevelt convincingly 
defeated Hoover, and the Democratic-controlled Congress catapulted to a 
93. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 701–02. 
94. See Godehn & Quindry, supra note 15, at 265, 269. 
95. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 689, 717. 
96. Rubin, supra note 6, at 570–71. 
97.  Godehn & Quindry, supra note 15, at 264. 
98. Id.
 99. See Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 708. 
 100.  Id. at 708, 716–21. 
101. Rubin, supra note 6, at 571. 
102. See BERG, supra note 3, at 291; Werrell, supra note 10, at 15. 
103. BLACK, supra note 11, at 249–50; see Werrell, supra note 10, at 15. 
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nearly two-to-one advantage in the Senate and an even more commanding 
three-to-one lead in the House.104  With a change in administrations, James
A. Farley replaced Brown as the new Postmaster General.105 
Looking to build on their electoral success in 1932, Democrats began
researching issues—“real or fabricated”—involving former President 
Hoover that they could manipulate into a campaign issue for the upcoming
1934 midterm elections.106  Brown’s spoils conferences presented this 
opportunity.107  Beginning in September 1933, Senator Hugo Black (D-Ala.)
and his Senate investigative committee collected documents, held hearings, 
and questioned witnesses about the circumstances surrounding the spoils 
conferences, the decision-making to retain the private airlines for mail 
delivery, and if this conduct violated federal statutes requiring competitive 
bidding.108  The committee subpoenaed the financial records of many aviation 
industry leaders, including Lindbergh, even demanding records of stock 
transactions since 1924.109  Ultimately, the Senate committee uncovered
some suspicious, questionable activity surrounding the allocation of airmail 
contracts, and Black argued that these practices resembled a “conspiracy 
to defraud the government.”110 
Black’s committee introduced evidence of Brown’s “high-handed treatment”
of some111 but prevented Brown from testifying despite the former Postmaster 
General’s repeated requests to appear and defend his policies.112 
Understandably, some accused Black113 and his committee of conducting
a less than impartial investigation, and, although effective in generating 
104. See BLACK, supra note 11, at 249–50. 
105. U.S. Postmasters General, supra note 75.  James A. Farley actively participated
in Roosevelt’s initial 1932 Presidential campaign.  See BLACK, supra note 11, at 249.  When 
Roosevelt addressed his supporters on election night, Farley stood next to the President-
elect who described his future Postmaster General as one of the two people most responsible 
for his victory.  Id. 
 106. DAN HAMPTON, THE FLIGHT: CHARLES LINDBERGH’S DARING AND IMMORTAL
1927 TRANSATLANTIC CROSSING 263 (2017). 
107. See id.; T.A. HEPPENHEIMER, TURBULENT SKIES: THE HISTORY OF COMMERCIAL 
AVIATION 35 (1995). 
108. See HEPPENHEIMER, supra note 107, at 35; Godehn & Quindry, supra note 15, 
at 254; Werrell, supra note 10, at 15. 
109. BERG, supra note 3, at 291. 
110. Werrell, supra note 10, at 15; see Rubin, supra note 6, at 571. 
111. Rubin, supra note 6, at 571. 
112. See Berchtold, supra note 5, at  443–44. 
113. Black’s professional career prospered under Roosevelt, who appointed him to 
the U.S. Supreme Court in 1937.  1 DAVID M. O’BRIEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS: 
STRUGGLES FOR POWER AND GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTABILITY 1041 (6th ed. 2005). 
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front page headlines, none of the investigation positively influenced public 
policy.114 
A longtime critic of the airmail system operating under the Republican 
Hoover administration,115 Senator Black led the hearings into May 1934,
vociferously arguing that Brown fraudulently allocated the airmail contracts.116 
Among other revelations surfacing in the Black proceedings occurring at 
the height of the Great Depression, the executive of United Air witnessed
his initial $253 airline investment grow to a value of $35 million.117 
While the news of exorbitant salaries of some airline executives shocked 
the public, some airlines and their executives understandably profited after
investing in the speculative stock of the airline industry during the bull 
market years of 1927 to 1929.118  Some aviation stocks rose dramatically 
in the initial market boom preceding the Great Depression, but this rise in 
value was not isolated to the aviation industry because other stocks also 
benefited as a consequence of the speculation market.119  Just days before
Roosevelt entered his fateful order, Post Office Solicitor Karl Crowley 
reviewed the Black committee evidence and issued a brief concluding that 
Brown fraudulently awarded the airmail contracts after conspiring with 
120 the carriers to prohibit competitors from bidding on the routes.
On February 9, 1934, and without warning, President Roosevelt signed
Executive Order 6591, directing the Air Corps to transport the airmail 
beginning February 19 and effectively canceling the airmail contracts
with more than thirty different airlines.121  The President argued executive
action was necessary, contending that the Brown airmail contracts were 
negotiated through collusion and fraud.122  Officially, Postmaster General
James Farley canceled the airmail contracts on the same day, but only after 
participating in a conference at the White House,123 further corroborating
114. See Berchtold, supra note 5, at 443–44.
115.  Id. at 442. 
116. See BLACK, supra note 11, at 321. 
117.  BERG, supra note 3, at 291–92. 
118.  Berchtold, supra note 5, at 444. 
119.  Id. 
 120. See Libby, supra note 18, at 44.  Karl Crowley was personally familiar with the
events leading up to the Air Mail Affair.  Prior to his appointment as Post Office Solicitor, he
worked as a lobbyist for a client seeking an airmail contract, but he was unsuccessful in 
obtaining it.  Berchtold, supra note 5, at 443–44. 
121. Exec. Order No. 6591: The Army Temporarily Flies the Mail, 3 PUB. PAPERS
93, 93 (Feb. 9, 1934); BERG, supra note 3, at 291. 
122. John F. Shiner, Benjamin Foulois and the Fight for an Independent Air Force, 
in AVIATION’S GOLDEN AGE: PORTRAITS FROM THE 1920s AND 1930s, at 74, 83 (William 
M. Leary ed., 1st ed. 1989). 
123. Berchtold, supra note 5, at 443. 
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that Roosevelt directed the action.124  The following day, The Washington 
Post read: “Charging fraud and collusion, President Roosevelt yesterday 
directed the cancellation of all air mail contracts with domestic companies 
—thus reshaping if not collapsing the Nation’s network of private transport 
concerns.”125  In fact, Roosevelt was so anxious to cancel the contracts 
and remove the private airlines, he disregarded Farley’s request to delay 
the Air Corps start day until June 1 to accommodate a transition period,126 
a decision the President undoubtedly regretted. 
Later responding to the airline lawsuits, Roosevelt and Farley contended 
that the airlines participating in Brown’s spoils conferences conspired to
prevent other airlines from bidding on airmail contracts or route extensions, 
which violated federal statute § 3950.127  Violating § 3950 empowered
the Postmaster General to “annul” the airmail contract without notice and 
hearing and ban the carrier from participating in any future contract for a 
period of five years following the first offense.128  Additionally, the
contractual language allowed the Postmaster General to cancel the certificate 
“for willful neglect on the part of the holder to carry out any rules, 
regulations, or orders made for its guidance.”129  When doing so, the Postmaster 
General was required to provide both written notice and provide the airline 
with forty-five days to respond.130  In this instance, the Postmaster General 
did neither.131 
Before acting, Roosevelt consulted some within his administration.  In
the days before February 9, he asked the post office to contact the chief of 
the Air Corps, Benjamin Foulois,132 about the Army air arm’s ability to
124. See Ravich, supra note 20, at 7; Rubin, supra note 6, at 571; Shiner, supra note 122,
at 83; Werrell, supra note 10, at 15; Mark C. Mathieson, Comment, Bankruptcy of Airlines: 
Causes, Complaints, and Changes, 61 J. AIR L. & COM. 1017, 1020 n.18 (1996). 
125. Leon Dure, Jr., Roosevelt Cancels Air Mail Contracts; Army Plans to Fill Breach, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 1934, at A1; see also Werrell, supra note 10, at 16. 
126. See BLACK, supra note 11, at 321; Werrell, supra note 10, at 15. 
127. See Pac. Air Transp. v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 649, 745, 767 (1942) (citing
Rev. Stat. § 3950 (1872) (codified as amended at 39 U.S.C. § 6421 (repealed 1970))). 
128. Id. at 745 (citing Rev. Stat. § 3950). 
129.  Id. at 660. 
130. Id.
 131. Id. at 746. 
132. In addition to serving as the Chief of the Army Air Corps until 1931, Foulois 
was a leader in military aviation and remained passionate about flying, even piloting the 
plane that dropped a baseball to Babe Ruth from a height of 250 feet in a publicity stunt 
receiving media attention. Shiner, supra note 122, at 78, 80. 
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transport the mail.133  Just prior to this time, Foulois was actively lobbying
the legislature and advocating for an independent air branch of the military to 
conduct air missions, but both the administration and Congress repeatedly 
thwarted him.134  At this time, the U.S. Air Force did not exist, but the
prescient Foulois saw the value of achieving air superiority in combat 
situations, and he was the leading advocate for a separate air service that 
functioned independently of the Army.135 
While he undoubtedly viewed the President’s inquiry as more closely 
resembling an order rather than a request, he also considered transferring
the mail as an opportunity to gain support for his plans to convert the Air 
Corps into an independent military operation.136 After discussing the matter
with his staff but breaching Army protocol when bypassing the military 
Chief of Staff General Douglas MacArthur, Foulois confirmed the Air Corps’ 
ability to meet this challenge and responded they could be ready in a week 
to ten days.137 
As one of the first to criticize Roosevelt’s unilateral action and challenge
his executive authority, Charles Lindbergh emerged as the major opponent of
the contract cancellation.138 Although his historic flight occurred seven
years earlier, he was still a national celebrity and active in the aviation 
industry where he worked for Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc.139 
Lindbergh did not serve in any official management capacity within the
company nor did he negotiate the airmail contracts,140 but Lindbergh believed
his employer heavily contributed to the undervalued aviation industry as 
well as the economy, and equally important, he believed Roosevelt was 
treating the airline industry unfairly.141 
Lindbergh sent the President a telegram dated February 11, 1934, and 
simultaneously released a copy to the media.142  Among other criticisms,
Lindbergh reminded the President that certain inalienable, constitutionally 
guaranteed rights bind us as Americans.143  Specifically, he alleged that
Roosevelt’s decision to cancel the “air mail contracts condemns the largest 
portion of our commercial aviation without just trial.”144  Further, he 
133. Id. at 83. 
134. Id. at 81. 
135. See id. at 74, 77. 
136. Id. at 83. 
137. Id.
 138. Werrell, supra note 10, at 17. 
139.  BERG, supra note 3, at 292; Werrell, supra note 10, at 14. 
140.  See BERG, supra note 3, at 292; HAMPTON, supra note 106, at 264. 
141.  See BERG, supra note 3, at 292. 
142.  BLACK, supra note 11, at 321. 
143.  See Libby, supra note 18, at 45. 
144.  Id. 
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reminded Roosevelt of the fundamental right to a fair trial and alleged the 
President’s actions “[did] not discriminate between innocence and guilt 
and place[d] no premium on honest business.”145 
Further, Lindbergh asserted that companies and their officers “[had] not 
been given the opportunity of a hearing and improper acts by many companies 
affected [had] not been established.”146  While reminding the President
that America led the world in every aspect of aviation at the time, including 
the quality of airlines, aircraft, and equipment, Lindbergh also warned that 
the hasty, misguided decision would “damage all American aviation.”147 
Within days of the contract cancellation, The New York Times reported
Lindbergh’s fateful comments that “the lives of men inexperienced in mail 
operations, and flying planes not equipped with radio or the blind flying 
instruments necessary for the service, may be risked.”148 
As two of the country’s most popular figures squared off on this
controversial subject matter that later included military fatalities, the Air 
Mail Affair unsurprisingly received intense media attention throughout
the first half of 1934.149  Both the President and the partisan Congress 
challenged Lindbergh to defend the industry and some of the more 
inflammatory revelations that led to the multiple contract cancellations.  
For more than two hours on March 16, the media recorded and photographed 
Lindbergh in a congressional caucus room where he addressed some of the 
aviation industry’s more questionable practices, but insisted they should not 
be condemned without an opportunity to be heard.150 
While defending his beloved—yet controversial—aviation industry under
the glare of the media spotlight, Lindberg utilized his vast skill set to articulate 
well-reasoned, measured, and accurate responses,151 much like how he utilized




 148. Action on Air Mail Unfair, Lindbergh Tells President, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 
1934, at A1; see also Werrell, supra note 10, at 17. Lindbergh’s prolific flying career 
included extensive experience flying the mail.  Prior to his transatlantic crossing, he worked as 
a pilot at Roberts Airlines, flying the mail between St. Louis and Chicago, where he 
frequently endured harsh weather conditions that even forced him to jump from his airplane at 
times.  THOMAS KESSNER, THE FLIGHT OF THE CENTURY: CHARLES LINDBERGH & THE RISE OF 
AMERICAN AVIATION 37–39 (2010); see CHARLES A. LINDBERGH, THE SPIRIT OF ST. LOUIS 6 
(1953).
149. Werrell, supra note 10, at 14. 
150. See BERG, supra note 3, at 294. 
151. Id.
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when calculating the amount of fuel necessary for his transatlantic journey.152 
When confronted by multiple detractors and skeptics, Lindbergh demonstrated
unwavering resiliency, resisted the intense pressure of the public spotlight, 
deflected the criticism, and communicated153 with the precision of higher
mathematics.  Later that same day, Lindbergh endured another interrogation, 
this one led by the special assistant to the attorney general and an investigator 
from the Black committee while in the presence of a stenographer.154  In 
this session, Lindbergh answered questions for more than three hours while 
addressing industry accusations and deflecting personal attacks.155 
Notwithstanding Lindbergh’s concerns about due process denied, the 
Roosevelt decision invited disaster. Even before beginning the operation, 
the Air Corps suffered two fatalities on February 16 while conducting practice 
flights.156  During the first week of the operation, another three pilots died,
another five were critically injured, and the Air Corps accrued a collective 
$300,000 in property damage.157  Beginning with the first Air Corps pilot 
fatalities in February and extending into March, each day seemed to unveil 
a different “horror story.”158 
Several factors contributed to the operation’s demise. Flying combat
missions during the day when the enemy is visible was substantially different
than flying the mail at night for great distances in varying weather
conditions.159  Also, aviation technology was largely undeveloped in the
1930s.160  Further, there were not any radar navigation devices or ground 
control coordination to assist the pilots.161 
The Air Corps’ planes lacked the blind-flying instruments and radios 
that the commercial air pilots utilized while conducting their nighttime 
mail runs.162  Foulois recognized this deficiency and he upgraded the
Army plane instruments, ensuring each plane included a radio receiver, a 
directional compass, and an artificial horizon in the days immediately 
152. LINDBERGH, supra note 148, at 84.  While overseeing the construction of his
single-engine monoplane in San Diego, Lindberg located a globe in a public library and 
stretched a string across the surface between New York and Paris to measure the distance 
of the transatlantic flight, a factor necessary to calculate the plane’s anticipated fuel 
consumption.  Id. at 83–84. 
153. See BERG, supra note 3, at 294. 
154.  Id. 
 155. Id. at 295. 
156. Werrell, supra note 10, at 18. 
157.  BERG, supra note 3, at 293. 
158.  Id. at 293–94. 
159. See Shiner, supra note 122, at 84.
160.  Werrell, supra note 10, at 17. 
161.  Id. 
 162. Shiner, supra note 122, at 83–84. 
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preceding the operation.163  While the Army hastily trained the pilots on
using the new instruments, many resisted relying on these and instead continued 
to trust their flying instincts even when encountering challenging weather 
conditions.164  Finally, the 1934 winter weather was especially inclement, 
producing considerable amounts of rain, snow, and fog,165 further complicating
the flying conditions. The harsh weather proved heavily problematic as 
the Army pilots flew in “open-cockpit machines,” which exposed them to 
the punishing elements.166 
The decision presented economic consequences as well.  Roosevelt’s 
action threatened both the airline industry’s stability and its long-term viability, 
which invited economic turmoil and jeopardized America’s standing as the 
premiere air transport system in the world.167  A successful, efficient airmail 
system not only brought “the country closer together” but it fostered a 
successful business environment.168  Instead, the Roosevelt decision prompted
economic ruin with many airlines reducing flight schedules and laying off 
employees.169  Immediately following the Executive order, Transcontinental
& Western Air President Richard Robbins asked Roosevelt and Farley to
reconsider the decision, explaining the airmail revenue would allow his
company to spend another $3.5 million on new flying equipment in the 
upcoming months.170  Instead, the action forced Robbins to furlough employees 
and restructure a minimal passenger flight schedule effective February 18.171 
At the time of the contract cancellation, the United airline executive’s 
massive investment growth172 was an exception to the airline industry’s
fiscal health.  In fact, few airlines were able to break even or realize small 
profits in 1933, with some even battling massive operating losses prior to 
this time.173  Prior to the Roosevelt intervention, Brown’s hope to expand
passenger service and decrease the airline dependence on the mail subsidy 
was materializing, because the passenger revenues were increasing to a 
163. Id. at 84. 
164.  Id. 
165.  BERG, supra note 3, at 293. 
166.  Shiner, supra note 122, at 84. 
167.  See Werrell, supra note 10, at 15, 17–18. 
168.  Id. at 14. 
169.  Id. at 17. 
170.  BERG, supra note 3, at 292. 
171.  Id. at 293; see Werrell, supra note 10, at 17. 
172.  BERG, supra note 3, at 291–92. 
173.  Berchtold, supra note 5, at 445. 
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level where many airlines would have been profitable within three to five 
years without the mail subsidy.174 
Following an extensive public clamor, Roosevelt eventually reversed
himself.  On March 10, he withdrew Executive Order 6591 and allowed the 
airlines to resume responsibility for transporting the mail.175  However, 
the President insisted that the new airmail contracts restricted the mail 
delivery term to three years, not the previous ten years as allowed under 
the McNary-Watres legislation.176  Further, he demanded that any airlines
or former participants in the Brown spoils conferences were ineligible for 
the newly solicited airmail routes.177 
While this new action prevented thirty-one individuals and former airline 
executives from participating in future aviation contracts and essentially 
banished them from the industry, some of the affected airlines maneuvered
around Roosevelt’s restriction by changing their names.178  For example,
American Airways changed to American Airlines, Eastern Air Transpor
changed into Eastern Airlines, United Aircraft became United Airlines, an
t 
d
Transcontinental & Western Air changed its name to Trans World Airlines.179 
On March 27, Congress formally authorized Roosevelt’s action, directing 
the departments of war and commerce to assist with mail delivery.180  The
legislative language duplicated the language in Roosevelt’s Executive Order 
6591.181  Later that summer, Roosevelt signed the Air Mail Act of 1934,
effectively disassembling the previous McNary-Watres legislation.182 
Engineered by the White House,183 the Black-McKellar Act mandated that
multiple federal agencies regulate the airlines and significantly reduced 
the postal subsidies.184 
The Air Corps’ seventy-eight-day operation was considered a “dismal
failure”185 and by May 8, the commercial airlines were flying the mail 
again.186  Before commercial air service resumed, however, the Air Corps
suffered twelve fatalities, sixty-six accidents, and completed just over 65% 
174. Id.
 175. Libby, supra note 18, at 46. 
176. Id.; see McNary-Watres Act, ch. 223, sec. 2, § 6, 46 Stat. 259, 259 (1930). 
177. Libby, supra note 18, at 46. 
178. Werrell, supra note 10, at 22. 
179. BERG, supra note 3, at 295. 
180.  Act of Mar. 27, 1934, ch. 100, § 1, 48 Stat. 508, 508. 
181. Id.; Exec. Order No. 6591: The Army Temporarily Flies the Mail, 3 PUB. PAPERS
93, 93 (Feb. 9, 1934). 
182.  Air Mail Act of 1934, ch. 466, 48 Stat. 933. 
183. Berchtold, supra note 5, at 438. 
184.  Air Mail Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 933; Rubin, supra note 6, at 572. 
185. FRISBEE, supra note 7, at 50. 
186. BERG, supra note 3, at 296. 
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of all scheduled flights.187  If the loss of life was not bad enough, the operating 
expenses rose to $0.70 per mile during the Presidential experiment, nearly 
double the cost of the commercial airlines operating expenses just months 
earlier.188 
The Air Mail Affair introduced political consequences as well.  Many 
concluded that the issue was “a setback and an embarrassment” for the
President.189  Even the President’s own son, Elliott, who worked as an
editor at an aviation publication, criticized his father’s involvement in the 
issue.190  Perhaps, the American writer Walter Lippmann summarized the
issue best when he opined that the issue “had deep repercussions for 
[Roosevelt]. For the first time since he had taken office, his authority had 
been effectively challenged, making him appear both fallible and impenitent.”191 
The criticism, the consequences, and the potentially lasting political impact 
were not missed on Roosevelt, who later remarked to his press secretary 
that the administration would avenge192 this regrettable experience with
Lindbergh while threatening “[w]e will get that fair-haired boy.”193 
V. THE PACIFIC AIR DECISION
Nearly nine years passed from the time Lindbergh initially raised his 
due process concern on February 11, 1934,194 and the Pacific Air court
ultimately decided the matter on December 7, 1942.195 Before the U.S. 
187. FRISBEE, supra note 7, at 50; Shiner, supra note 122, at 84. 
188. Shiner, supra note 122, at 84. 
189. BLACK, supra note 11, at 322; Berchtold, supra note 5, at 438; Werrell, supra
note 10, at 14. 
190. Werrell, supra note 10, at 21. 
191. BERG, supra note 3, at 296. 
192. And he does. In the years preceding World War II, Lindbergh made a series of 
radio broadcasts and public speeches discouraging American entry into the European 
conflict. BLACK, supra note 11, at 537.  In response, Roosevelt painted Lindbergh as 
a Nazi, although repeated efforts to wiretap his conversations failed to reveal any proof.  
Id.  After the United States entered the war, Roosevelt worked to keep Lindbergh from 
serving in the military, despite the former aviator’s determination to fight following the 
attack on Pearl Harbor.  John J. Dwyer, FDR v. Lindbergh: Setting the Record Straight, 
NEW AM. (Jan. 21, 2014), https://www.thenewamerican.com/culture/history/item/17341-
fdr-vs-lindbergh-setting-the-record-straight?tmpl=component&print=1 [perma.cc/76E6-
4E89]. Eventually, Lindbergh overcame these obstacles, and he served admirably for his 
country. Id. 
 193. HAMPTON, supra note 106, at 264. 
194. Libby, supra note 18, at 44–45. 
195.  Pac. Air Transp. v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 649 (1942). 
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Court of Claims entered judgment, Commissioner Richard H. Akers 
reviewed the facts and issues surrounding the Air Mail Affair and initially 
decided the case.196 
In fact, Commissioner Akers heard evidence on the matter over a collective
sixty-three-day period that stretched over more than two years between 
April 26, 1938 and June 11, 1940.197  He heard from a substantial number
of witnesses in three different venues, Washington, D.C., Sanford, North 
Carolina, and Los Angeles.198  He received 769 exhibits into evidence, and 
the trial transcript totaled 7,164 pages.199  Ultimately, the commissioner
decided that the Roosevelt administration terminated the airmail agreements 
in good faith200 but equally found the evidence “insufficient to substantiate
the claims of the [administration] that these contracts and route certificates 
were secured through fraud, collusion, or a conspiracy.”201  Further, he
concluded the plaintiffs were entitled to $364,423.43 in collective damages 
for the services performed in January and February 1934.202  Finally, he
decided that plaintiffs were not liable under any of the counterclaims pursued 
by the government.203 
Although the Pacific Air decision addressed multiple airmail routes and 
several different air carriers throughout the opinion, the holding solely 
applied to the three different plaintiff airlines operating five specific airmail 
routes.204  They included Pacific Air Transport, Boeing Air Transport, and 
United Air Lines Transport Corporation.205  Pacific Air Transport was the
plaintiff in No. 43029, involving Route 8 between Seattle, Washington, 
and Los Angeles, California.206 It received the contract and began operating 
this airmail route beginning September 15, 1926.207  Following two years 
of satisfactory service and as allowed by statute, Pacific Air Transport 
exchanged the airmail contract for a route certificate on May 27, 1930, 
with the Postmaster General’s approval.208  When receiving the route certificate,
196. Godehn & Quindry, supra note 15, at 259.  This author relies on secondary
materials in reviewing the decision of Commissioner Richard H. Akers. 
197. Id.
 198. Id.
 199. Id. at 259–60. 
200. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 765. 
201.  Godehn & Quindry, supra note 15, at 271. 
202.  Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 765. 
203.  Id. 
 204. Id.
 205. Id. at 649. 
206. Id. at 654.  Originally, Vern C. Gorst was the low bidder on this route first 
advertised on July 15, 1925, but he promptly sublet this route to Pacific Air Transport with the
Postmaster General’s written approval on March 19, 1926. Id.
 207. Id. at 655. 
208. Id.
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Pacific Air Transport posted the statutorily required surety or bond.209  On
July 1, 1930, and also pursuant to statute, the Postmaster General extended 
Pacific Air Transport Route 8 to include the additional distance between 
Los Angeles and San Diego.210  Pacific Air Transport operated Route 8 
through February 19, 1934.211 
Boeing Air Transport was the plaintiff in No. 43030 and began operating
airmail Route C.A.M. 18 between Chicago and San Francisco on July 1,
1927.212  Following two years of satisfactory service and as allowed by
statute, Boeing Air Transport exchanged the airmail contract for a route 
certificate on October 21, 1930.213  When receiving the route certificate, 
Boeing Air Transport provided the required surety.214 Although Boeing
Air Transport did not request an extension on the Chicago, Illinois, and 
San Francisco, California, airmail route, Postmaster Brown later directed 
Boeing Air Transport to expand Route 18 to include an extended route 
between Omaha, Nebraska, and Watertown, South Dakota, beginning 
January 16, 1932.215 
As the plaintiff in No. 43031, Boeing Air Transport also operated Route 
A.M. 5 between Salt Lake City, Utah, and Seattle, Washington, which 
it acquired from Varney Air Lines, Inc. beginning October 1, 1933.216 
Originally two separate routes, known as Route A.M. 5 and Route C.A.M.
32, these routes eventually merged into a single airmail route on May 27, 
1930.217 Initially, Varney Air Lines, Inc. was the low bidder on the previous
Route 5 between Elko, Nevada, and Pasco, Washington, first advertised 
on July 15, 1925.218  Additionally, Varney Air Lines, Inc. was the low 
bidder on another Pacific Northwest airmail route, Route 32, and entere
into a contract with the government to transport the mail beginnin
d
g
September 23, 1929.219  Later, Postmaster General Brown found that the
209. Id. at 656. 
210. Id. at 663. 
211. Id. at 655. 
212. Id. at 663–64.  Similarly, Edward Hubbard and Boeing Airplane Company were
the low bidder on this route first advertised on November 15, 1926, but Hubbard later sublet 
this route to Boeing Air Transport with the Postmaster General’s written approval on April 
29, 1927.  Id. at 664. 
213. Id. at 664–65. 
214. Id. at 665. 
215. Id. at 666. 
216.  Id. at 666, 670–71. 
217. Id. at 669. 
218. See id. at 666–68. 
219. Id. at 668. 
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public interest was better served by consolidating these routes, pursuant
to the McNary-Watres Act.220  Varney Air Lines, Inc. continued to operate
this consolidated airmail Route 5 until October 1, 1933, when Boeing Air 
Transport sublet the route with Postmaster General approval and acquired 
Varney Air Lines, Inc.’s assets, including “physical properties.”221 
United Air Lines Transport Corporation was the plaintiff in No. 43032
after merging with National Air Transport, Inc.222  As the low bidder,
National Air Transport, Inc. was awarded Route C.A.M. 17 between New 
York, New York, and Chicago, Illinois, beginning September 1, 1927.223 
Following two years of satisfactory service and as allowed by statute,
National Air Transport exchanged the airmail contract for a route certificate 
on October 22, 1930, with the Postmaster General’s approval.224  When
receiving the route certificate, National Air Transport posted the necessary 
bond.225  On December 28, 1934, and well after the contract cancellation,
National Air Transport, Inc. merged with three other airlines into United 
Air Lines Transport Corporation, which assumed the ownership interest 
in National Air Transport, Inc.’s cause of action against the Postmaster 
General.226 
Similarly, United Air Lines Transport Corporation was the plaintiff in 
No. 43033 following the National Air Transport, Inc. merger.227  Initially, 
National Air Transport, Inc. was the low bidder on airmail C.A.M. 3 between 
Chicago, Illinois, and Dallas, Texas, which it operated from May 12, 1926, 
until February 19, 1934.228  After two years of satisfactory service and as
allowed by statute, National Air Transport exchanged the airmail contract 
for a route certificate on May 3, 1930.229 When receiving the route certificate,
National Air Transport provided the necessary surety.230  Following the 
merger in late 1934, United Air Lines Transport Corporation assumed the 
ownership interest in National Air Transport, Inc.’s cause of action against 
the Postmaster General.231 
After Roosevelt reversed himself and restored commercial airmail delivery, 
the government prevented any of the more than thirty airlines, including
220. Id. at 668–69. 
221. Id. at 671. 
222. Id. at 672. 
223. See id. at 672–73. 
224. Id. at 673. 
225. Id.
 226. Id. at 672. 
227. Id. at 672, 674. 
228. Id. at 674–75. 
229. See id.
 230. Id. at 675–76. 
231. Id. at 672. 
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the plaintiffs, whose certificates were canceled on February 9, from resuming
an airmail schedule.232  Eventually, all three plaintiff air carriers merged 
into the United group.233  Also within the United group was a management 
corporation, United Air Lines, Inc.234  Subsequently, United Air Lines,
Inc. successfully bid on the routes previously awarded to the three former, 
separate air carriers: Pacific Air Transport, Boeing Air Transport, and National 
Air Transport.235  United Air Lines, Inc. was not prohibited from bidding
on these routes in spring 1934 because it did not possess a certificate 
canceled on February 19.236 
Ultimately, the Pacific Air court sided with Roosevelt.  The court held
that the plaintiff airlines violated § 3950, justifying the Roosevelt 
administration’s decision to annul the mail contracts.237  Disagreeing with 
Commissioner Akers, the court found that the plaintiffs and other carriers 
“made a combination to avoid competitive bidding” through their collective 
agreement.238  Further, the court concluded that the plaintiffs entered these
agreements and combinations to prevent competitive bidding for the airmail 
contracts at the expense of others seeking these contracts; the same air 
carriers sought to preserve the system using the high rates of payment, and 
the air carriers wished to remain in favor with the Postmaster General who 
enjoyed considerable discretionary power over the industry.239 
The majority opinion specifically faulted plaintiffs, the United group,
as well as Aviation Group, the former Transcontinental Air Transport, and 
the former Western Air Express for conspiring  with the Postmaster General 
that they would not bid on contracts during the competitive bidding process 
unless the Postmaster General selected that carrier for that specific route.240 
The court further held that these same carriers agreed to use their influence
to dissuade others from bidding on contracts.241 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Benjamin Horsley Littleton agreed with 
the outcome but disagreed with the court that plaintiffs participated in a 
combination or agreement “to prevent the making of any bid for carrying 
232. Id. at 766–67. 
233. Id. at 765. 
234. Id. at 766. 
235. Id.
 236. Id.
 237. Id. at 789. 
238. Id. at 776. 
239. Id. at 764–65. 
240. Id. at 764. 
241. Id. 
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the mail,”242 as prohibited in § 3950.  Judge Littleton emphasized that the
plaintiffs’ five route certificates were all awarded following an open 
competitive bidding process and well before the May 1930 conference.243  He
disagreed that the plaintiffs schemed to protect their rates considering 
United Air possessed the only transcontinental airmail route and the Postmaster 
General insisted on two additional transcontinental lines operated by 
competitors, which was against the airline’s financial interests.244 
Although finding the airmail contracts are properly annulled, the court 
held that the plaintiffs were entitled to payment for delivering the mail 
from January through February 1934.245  Specifically, the court awarded 
Pacific Air Transport an amount of $59,519.32 for unpaid services along 
Route 8; Boeing Air Transport an amount of $143,441.68 for mail delivery
along Route 18 and an additional $42,931.62 for unpaid services along Route
5; and United Air Lines Transport Corp., as the successor to National Air
Transport, Inc., an amount of $66,748.80 for mail delivery along Route 
17 and an additional $51,782.01 for unpaid services along Route 3, totaling
$364,423.43 in damages.246  Likewise, the court rejected the Roosevelt 
administration’s counterclaim request.247 
Representative Clyde Kelly (R-Pa.) was unimpressed.  Like Lindbergh, 
he criticized the Roosevelt decision, concluding “[t]here is no showing to
warrant such a drastic and arbitrary act as the cancellation of all contracts
without a hearing.  There was no justification for destroying all contracts . . . .”248 
Further dispelling any fraud allegations, thirty-one of the thirty-four canceled
airmail contracts were awarded between 1925 and 1927 following a competitive 
bidding process that included three to nine interested parties per contract.249 
The remaining three canceled contracts or certificates were awarded by 
“Postmaster General Brown to the lowest responsible bidder.”250  Significantly,
all five contracts at issue in the Pacific Air lawsuit were awarded following a 
competitive bidding process.251 
Considerable publicity preceded the Roosevelt decision to unilaterally 
annul all the airmail contracts. The highly public Senate hearings and
investigations revealed shocking economic gains by some carriers and their 
242. Id. at 794 (Littleton, J., concurring) (citing Rev. Stat. § 3950 (1872) (codified 
as amended at 39 U.S.C. § 6421 (repealed 1970))). 
243. Id. 
244. Id. at 795. 
245. See id. at 790 (majority opinion). 
246.  Id. at 757, 790. 
247. Id. at 793. 
248. Berchtold, supra note 5, at 442.
 249. Id. at 441. 
250. Id.
 251. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 768. 
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owners.252  Among other disclosures surfacing in the Black proceedings, 
the executive of United benefited from an initial $253 airline investment 
that increased to a value of $35 million.253 
With convenient timing and occurring just days before Roosevelt acted, 
Post Office Solicitor Karl Crowley issued a written opinion concluding 
that the government could cancel the contracts through any number of 
methods, including: (1) a Presidential Executive order,254 (2) a breach of
contract action under McNary-Watres,255 (3) an order from the Postmaster
General based on the federal statute preventing bid-conspiring,256 (4) an
order from the Postmaster General upon a finding that the contracts are 
fraudulently awarded257 or, finally, (5) a postal regulation permitting the
Postmaster General to cancel contracts when in the public interest.258 
Although the Post Office Solicitor cited the Presidential Executive order
as an acceptable method, he advised against pursing this cause of action.259 
Instead, he recommended nullification pursuant to the third, fourth, and
fifth methods previously described.260 
Ironically, the Post Office Solicitor cited the breach of contract alternative
as a viable option but recommended against engaging the McNary-Watres 
statute as the preferred method to discontinue the contracts.261  Specifically, 
the statute allowed the government to terminate any agreement if the carrier 
failed to observe any “rules, regulations, or orders.”262  Conspiring to circumvent
the bidding process and steer specific route certificates to specific air carriers 
arguably violated the Postal Service rules and regulations.  Interestingly, 
Crowley confirmed this was a viable cause of action, but he still recommended 
against Roosevelt acting under this option.263 
252. Berchtold, supra note 5, at 444. 
253. BERG, supra note 3, at 291–92. 
254. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 748 (citing Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 101, § 5, 
48 Stat. 283, 305). 
255. Id. (citing McNary-Watres Act, ch. 223, 46 Stat. 259 (1930)). 
256. Id. (quoting 39 U.S.C. § 6421 (repealed 1970)). 
257. Id.




 261. See id.
 262. Id. at 656 (quoting McNary-Watres Act, ch. 223, sec. 2, § 6, 46 Stat. 259, 260 
(1930)).
263. See id. at 748. 
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A. President Roosevelt Moved to Annul Airmail Agreements Under 
§ 3950, Alleging Competitive Bidding Violations 
In clear language, the McNary-Watres legislation authorized the Postmaster 
General to terminate an airmail agreement and outlined the grievance
procedure.264 More specifically: 
Such certificate may be canceled at any time for willful neglect on the part of the
holder to carry out any rules, regulations, or orders made for his guidance, notice 
of such intended cancellation to be given in writing by the Postmaster General 
and forty-five days allowed the holder in which to show cause why the certificate 
should not be canceled.265 
Roosevelt and his administration ignored this cause of action available 
under McNary-Watres. Instead, Roosevelt moved to act under a statute 
conducive to his narrative of the Air Mail Affair.  Section 3950 of the Revised 
Statues of the United States states:
No contract for carrying the mail shall be made with any person who has entered,
or proposed to enter, into any combination to prevent the making of any bid for
carrying the mail, or who has made any agreement, or given or performed, or
promised to give or perform[,] any consideration whatever to induce any other
person not to bid for any such contract; and if any person so offending is a
contractor for carrying the mail, his contract may be annulled; and for the first 
offense the person so offending shall be disqualified to contract for carrying the
mail for five years, and for the second offense shall be forever disqualified.266 
First, Roosevelt pointed to many deficiencies in Brown’s methods. His 
administration alleged that the plaintiff air carriers violated the statute
through corrupt, unlawful conduct by avoiding the competitive bidding process 
and steering Brown’s newly created twelve airmail routes to certain airlines
and effectively dividing the spoils among themselves.267  Specifically, 
Roosevelt contended that Brown circumvented the competitive bidding 
process when he awarded the transcontinental routes, assigning these lucrative 
routes to his preferred candidates.268  As an example, the administration was
highly critical that Brown awarded the middle or central transcontinental 
route to the newly formed Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. after 
264. McNary-Watres Act, sec. 2, § 6, 46 Stat. at 260.  Through much of the airmail 
legislation’s history, Congress consistently included a grievance procedure following a
contract termination.  Prior to the McNary-Watres legislation requiring a forty-five day 
written notice requirement and opportunity to be heard, the Kelly Amendment specified a 
sixty-day written notice requirement and opportunity to be heard on any cancellation.  
Kelly Amendment, ch. 603, sec. 2, § 6, 45 Stat. 594, 594 (1928). 
265.  McNary-Watres Act, sec. 2, § 6, 46 Stat. at 260. 
266. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 767 (citing Rev. Stat. § 3950 (1872) (codified 
as amended at 39 U.S.C. § 6421 (repealed 1970))). 
267. See id.
 268. Id. at 786. 
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Brown suggested this merger.269  Even more important to his critics, Brown 
disregarded a competitor’s lower bid.270 
Second, Roosevelt asserted that Brown abused his discretion when
interpreting the statutory language to award route extensions, or a new, 
separate airmail route stemming from the main route, to a specific air
carrier while avoiding the competitive bidding process.271  For example, 
Brown awarded a carrier with an extension route understanding that the 
same air carrier would later sublet the route to a different carrier meeting 
Brown’s approval.272  In effect, this was awarding a route to the latter air
carrier without competitive bidding.273 
Third, the Roosevelt administration faulted Brown for converting the 
airmail contracts into route certificates and extending the parties’ contractual 
obligation into as long as a ten-year term, although the statute allowed 
this.274  Intent on changing this discretionary power, Roosevelt persuaded
the heavily Democratic Congress in 1934 to eliminate the certificate conversion 
option and effectively terminate the ten-year contractual term.275 
Finally, the Roosevelt administration also criticized the payment methods 
funding the operators and, likewise, it persuaded a subsequent Congress 
to eliminate Brown’s space-weight system and lower the fees to “[not]
exceed 331/3 cents per airplane-mile for transporting a mail load not [to 
exceed] three hundred pounds.”276 
B. Brown Aimed to Develop Air Travel System Following 
McNary-Watres Legislation 
Between 1925 and 1927 and before Walter Brown’s arrival, the previous
Postmaster General both advertised and competitively bid each proposed 
269. See id. at 720.  Transcontinental &Western Air, Inc. received the middle route, 
which was defined as New York to Los Angeles through St. Louis.  Id. at 711, 716, 720. 
270. See id. at 782–84. 
271. See id. at 775–76. 
272. Id. at 776–77. 
273. Id. at 776. 
274. Id. at 691 (quoting McNary-Watres Act, ch. 223, sec. 2, § 6, 46 Stat. 259, 260 
(1930)); Berchtold, supra note 5, at 439, 446. 
275. Air Mail Act of 1934, ch. 466, § 3, 48 Stat. 933, 933–34; see Werrell, supra note 10, 
at 15. 
276. Air Mail Act of 1934 § 3(a)–(c), 48 Stat. at 933–94; Special Committee to 
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airmail route before ultimately awarding each of the five contracts involved
in the lawsuit.277  Following his appointment as Postmaster General on 
March 5, 1929, Brown aimed to support commercial aviation278 by
making the industry self-sufficient and less reliant on public subsidies.279 
At this time, the passenger industry was struggling financially with many
passenger routes mirroring the airmail routes.280  Similarly, he recognized
the expense and inefficiency of the airmail system that developed over 
time into an “illogical” system of multiple routes with some routes created 
through political pressure.281 
In February 1930, Brown forwarded his recommendations to improve
the system to Congress.282  The new McNary-Watres legislation reflected 
some, but not all, of the Brown recommendations proposed in his bill H.R. 
9500.283  Specifically, Brown recommended that the legislation maintain 
a competitive bidding clause but the Postmaster General should retain the 
flexibility to award certain airmail routes through negotiation when in the 
“public interest.”284  While he recognized competitive bidding was cost-effective, 
efficient, and preferable in almost all other governmental spending decisions, 
Brown believed that competitive bidding was a “myth” in the airmail 
business because only a “limited number of prospective responsible bidders” 
existed in the industry.285 
To Brown, his proposal to award contracts through negotiation was 
critical to shielding the Postal Service from irresponsible bidders who were 
less experienced, possibly unsafe, and fiscally unsound.286  His attempt to
balance the industry with a healthy representation of responsible and self-
sufficient providers was also reflected in his frequently repeated decision 
first announced at the May 1930 conference to add two additional 
transcontinental routes “independently and competitively owned.”287  Under
Brown’s approach, the additional east to west transcontinental routes made 
the transportation system more efficient by reaching more of the country.  
Then, he could consolidate or even eliminate some of the multiple, illogical 
shorter lines.288 
277. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 768. 
278. Id. at 684; U.S. Postmasters General, supra note 75. 
279. See Berchtold, supra note 5, at 445–46; Werrell, supra note 10, at 15. 
280. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 684, 772. 
281. Id. at 684. 
282. Id. at 685 (citing H.R. 9500, 71st Cong. (1930) (enacted)). 
283. See id. at 695. 
284. See H.R. 9500, § 4. 
285. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 688. 
286. See Godehn & Quindry, supra note 15, at 265, 269. 
287. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 700, 708, 718. 
288. Id. at 700. 
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Additionally, Brown’s proposed H.R. 9500 recommended that the 
Postmaster General make any route extensions or consolidations when in 
the public interest to do so.289  To promote passenger travel, he further
recommended a payment system based on a space-mileage basis, thus 
abandoning the previous system of subsidizing mail delivery based on the 
weight of the mail transported.290  By revising the payment system, the 
passenger airlines utilizing larger planes could transport the mail as well.291 
Ultimately, Congress passed the McNary-Watres legislation, which was 
later signed by President Hoover on April 29, 1930.292 The new legislation 
denied Brown’s proposal to award contracts by negotiation and without 
advertising, in favor of the traditional approach embracing a competitive 
bidding process.293  However, the new legislation allowed the Postmaster
General to make both route extensions and consolidations when in the 
public interest.294 
1. Competitive Bidding 
Brown intended to solve “some of the important airmail problems” by 
merging this service with the passenger travel industry to create “a
national network of [airmail] and passenger service.”295  Brown attempted
to restructure the illogical, inefficient airmail map that grew over time 
without a regard for need by designing an airmail service with the flexibility 
to accommodate passenger travel.296  He realized that some airmail routes
were not only unprofitable and expensive, but others were created following 
congressional political pressure.297 
Further, Brown recognized the value of the competitive bidding concept,
but he also believed it restricted his ability to overcome some of the 
industry problems.298  For this reason, Brown advocated for the flexibility 
to negotiate with qualified air carriers without advertising and without 
289. Id. at 686–87 (quoting H.R. 9500, § 6). 
290. See id. at 690 (citing H.R. 9500, § 4). 
291. See H.R. Res. 107, 85th Cong. (1957) (enacted). 
292. McNary-Watres Act, ch. 223, 46 Stat. 259 (1930); Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl.
at 690. 
293. See McNary-Watres Act § 4, 46 Stat. at 259. 
294. Id. at 259–60. 
295. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 683, 700. 
296.  See id. at 684, 688, 770. 
297. See id. at 683, 769–70. 
298. See id. at 770. 
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competitive bidding because of the “limited number of prospective
responsible bidders.”299 
Despite Brown’s preference, competitive bidding remained statutorily
required when Congress passed McNary-Watres in Spring 1930.300  However, 
this new legislation expanded the Postmaster General’s discretion over 
passenger travel, which was struggling financially.301  Recognizing that
many passenger routes mirrored the airmail routes, Brown aimed to expand 
passenger travel, improve efficiency, and reduce rates by combining services, 
specifically allowing mail carriers to transport passengers as well as the 
mail.302 
By creating a comprehensive national passenger and airmail service,
Brown attempted to grow the industry, expand competition, and enhance 
the quality of service.303 Much of Brown’s conduct involving the
transcontinental routes revealed his motives, captured his concerns, and 
illuminated his intentions. Recognizing there were a “limited number” of 
capable carriers, Brown believed Aviation Corporation (Aviation) was the 
most responsible air carrier to operate the southern route between Atlanta, 
Georgia, and Los Angeles, California.304  The carrier fit Brown’s criteria as a
strong, dependable operator, one of only a few qualified to manage this 
demanding route.305  Further, it was “separately owned” and competitively 
managed from the other candidates that operated or sought to operate another 
transcontinental passage.306  Additionally, Brown expected Aviation to
distribute portions of the route to other qualified air carriers307 after considering
“the pioneering rights,” a term reflecting an air carrier’s commitment and 
length of service to a region.308  Aviation did this.  When it merged with Delta
airlines in July 1930, Aviation agreed to subcontract an extension from 
either Atlanta, Georgia, or Birmingham, Alabama, to Dallas, Texas, to Delta, 
assuming Aviation received the southern transcontinental route.309 
299. Id. at 688. 
300. Id. at 771 (citing McNary-Watres Act, ch. 223, 46 Stat. 259 (1930)). 
301.  Id. at 697, 771–72. 
302. See id. at 683–84, 771; Berchtold, supra note 5, at 438; Werrell, supra note 10, at
15. 
303. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 770, 773; Werrell, supra note 10, at 15. 
304. See Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 688–89, 716–17. 
305. Id. at 717. 
306.  Id. at 708, 717, 779. 
307. See id. at 717. 
308. Id. at 688. When expanding the passenger travel and airmail delivery system, 
Brown believed in pioneering rights or the equities developed by the carriers in their various
regions.  Id. at 688–89.  Under this philosophy he deferred to the proven, qualified carriers who 
invested time and effort in a region, “created a good will” in commercial aviation, and
helped “persuade[] people to fly.”  Id. at 687–89, 772. 
 
 
309. Id. at 717–18. 
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Demonstrating its commitment to this region, Delta was a longtime operator 
of airmail routes between Dallas, Texas, and Atlanta, Georgia.310 
When awarding the central or middle transcontinental route, Brown 
likewise sought a responsible provider, and he remained true to his philosophy, 
favoring pioneering rights.311  Following the spoils conference, Western 
Air Express and Transcontinental Air Transport were the two primary 
contenders expressing interest in the middle transcontinental route.312 
Both provided a reliable, proven service to portions of this route between
New York, New York, and Los Angeles, California.313 However, Brown 
preferred that these two operators combine their resources to effectively 
operate the new route.314  Later, these two carriers merged with Pittsburgh
Aviation to form Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. before the post 
office advertised for bids.315 
As critics pointed out, Brown awarded the contract to Transcontinental 
& Western Air over the lower bid tendered by W.A. Letson’s United
Avigation.316  Letson formed United Avigation immediately prior to the
advertisement for bids and even expressed his intention to dissolve the 
airline depending on the contract’s outcome.317  When learning about the 
competing bid, William McCracken of Transcontinental Air Transport 
suggested that the advertisement require that the bidder maintain at least 
six months of night flying experience delivering airmail.318  Subsequently,
the post office included this requirement in the advertisement soliciting
bids for the middle transcontinental route.319  Obviously, this requirement
precluded United Avigation as a bidder because it was a newly formed 
carrier without any record of air service, but the newly merged Transcontinental 
310. Id. at 709, 778. 
311. Id. at 687–88. 
312. Id. at 720. 
313.  Id. at 687, 709. 
314. Id. at 720. 
315. Id.
 316. Id. at 784–85. United Avigation was a separate and distinct entity from both 
the United group, which already operated a transcontinental route, and Aviation Corporation, 
which was awarded Brown’s southern transcontinental route.  Id. at 717–18. 
317. Id. at 780–81. 
318. Id. at 781. 
319. Id. at 781–82. Sometime later, the Acting Postmaster General Coleman asked
the then-acting Attorney General John Lord O’Brian about the legality of the night flying 
requirement. Id. at 783.  Subsequently, O’Brian advised Coleman that, in his opinion, 
this particular requirement was illegal.  Id. 
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& Western Air was not excluded because Western Air had extensive 
experience flying the mail at night.320 
Transcontinental & Western Air was “separately owned” and independently
operated from the other two airlines operating the southern and northern
transcontinental route, an important consideration to Brown.321  Additionally,
in Brown’s opinion the new corporation was “strong financially” and 
stable economically.322  And prior to the merger, the two carriers provided 
a reliable service along the route between New York and Los Angeles,323 
further satisfying Brown’s concern for pioneering rights.324 
When insisting on two additional transcontinental routes that were
separately owned and independently operated,325 Brown was expanding
the market and generating economic opportunity while fostering a competitive 
environment.  Arguably, he further improved the efficiency of the airmail 
system by adding two additional transcontinental routes and eliminating 
some of the multiple shorter lines. Brown’s decision was unpopular with 
some, including the Pacific Air plaintiffs. At this time, the United group
operated the only existing transcontinental airmail route between New 
York and San Francisco326 and opposed Brown’s plan.  Contrary to the
allegation that he colluded with the plaintiffs, Brown’s action clearly opposed 
the United group’s interests.327 
2. Route Extensions 
Additionally, the new McNary-Watres legislation authorized the Postmaster
General to make extensions or consolidations of routes when in “the public 
interest.”328  When awarding extensions and making route consolidations,
320. Id. at 780–84. 
321.  Id. at 700, 708, 779. 
322. Id. at 779. 
323.  Prior to their merger, Transcontinental Air Transport operated an air passenger
service over this same route between New York and Los Angeles.  Id.  Similarly, Western Air 
operated a passenger service between Kansas City and Los Angeles.  Id. 
 324. Id. at 687. 
325. Id. at 707–08; see Werrell, supra note 10, at 15. 
326. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 707.  At this time, the United group, the United
system, or United Aircraft and Transport Corporation was the strongest aviation entity in 
the country.  Id.  National Air Transport operated the eastern half of the transcontinental 
route between New York and Chicago, and Boeing Air Transport system operated the 
western half of the route between Chicago and San Francisco.  Id.  The United system also 
included Pacific Air Transport, and later, in August 1930, it acquired Varney Lines, Inc. 
as well.  Id. 
 327. See id. at 707–08.  While recognizing the additional transcontinental routes
would impact their business, the United group further realized that Brown was intent on 
expanding routes to create a national network.  Id. 
328.  McNary-Watres Act, ch. 223, sec. 3, § 7, 46 Stat. 259, 260 (1930). 
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Brown could correct the illogical growth of the airmail map.329  He believed
that this legislative language, which he interpreted broadly, allowed him 
to designate a carrier for a specific route without competitive bidding.330 
When Brown convened what critics later called the spoils conference,331 
he assembled the air operators, asked them to recommend specific carriers
for specific proposed routes, and they provided him their recommendations.332 
Although Brown believed the legislation allowed the Postmaster General 
to extend routes from existing lines without competitive bidding and when 
in the public interest, he did not act prematurely.  Instead, he sought advice 
from the Comptroller General, who ultimately approved one proposed 
route extension and disapproved another.333  When responding to Brown’s
proposal to expand air service, the Comptroller General did not discourage 
this practice, offering even tacit approval.334  More specifically, or vaguely, 
he opined: 
No hard and fast rule may be laid down in advance for the determination of
the question whether a proposed extension of an air-mail route—an improvement 
of an existing route “by slight additions”—may be made and competitive bidding
eliminated, because the facts in each particular matter of proposed extension are 
for consideration and may vary in each case.  It may be stated generally, however,
that any extension of an established route must have as its basis the public need
stipulated by the law as necessary to be found and determined by the Postmaster
General, an immediate relationship to the basic project and existing service to be
so extended, and such subordinate relationship to the exiting route as to be
merely an extension thereof rather than a major addition thereto.335 
The Pacific Air court noted that Brown awarded only two route extensions
affecting the plaintiffs.336  Initially, the court did not fault his decision to
extend Pacific Air Transport’s route by 120 miles, or the distance between
Los Angeles, California, and San Diego, California, considering the air 
carrier already operated the 1141-mile route between Seattle, Washington, 
and Los Angeles, California, known as Route 8.337  According to the court, 
the second route extension was problematic, reflected decision-making 
329. See Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 684.
330.  Id. at 699, 775. 
331.  See, e.g., Barkowski, supra note 13, at 255. 
332.  Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 701–03. 
333.  Id. at 777. 
334.  See id. at 714. 
335.  Id. 
336.  Id. at 730. 
337.  Id. 
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contrary to the statute, and undermined competitive bidding.338  Specifically, 
Brown asked Boeing Air Transport to operate a 259-mile extension between 
Omaha, Nebraska, and Watertown, South Dakota, that extended from Route 
18.339 Ironically, Boeing Air Transport did not request this extension because 
it viewed this specific route as unprofitable.340  Ultimately, plaintiff acceded 
to the Postmaster General’s request with the understanding that Brown would 
later designate another operator to sublet this specific route extension.341 
Brown never designated another air carrier to operate or sublease the
Omaha and Watertown extension and, as Boeing Air Transport feared, 
it operated this route extension at a financial loss until the entire route was 
canceled in February 1934.342 
Although Boeing Air Transport accepted this extension when it was 
“detrimental to [its] interests,”343 the court criticized Brown for failing to
advertise and open this route to competitive bidding as well as cited this 
specific example as reason for annulling the contracts.344  Again, the court
failed to appreciate Brown’s collective considerations.  There were a limited 
number of responsible, competitive operators pursuing any given route, 
including this extension between Omaha and Watertown.345  Specifically, 
Brown expressed concerns about the “lack of experience or doubtful financial 
responsibility” of the other two or three carriers interested in this route.346 
3. Airmail Contract Converted into Route Certificate 
Similar to previous legislation, the McNary-Watres Act allowed the 
Postmaster General to convert an airmail contract into a long-term route 
certificate when finding it was in the “public interest.”347  Pursuant to the
statute, the Postmaster General could issue a route certificate to a carrier 
in exchange for the airmail contract, assuming the carrier provided a 
satisfactory service for a minimum of two years.348  Like a contract extension,
the route certificate could not exceed ten years from the date of the original 
338. Id. at 789. 
339. Id. at 730, 789.  Omaha was an intermediary stop along Route 18, or the 1931-
mile distance between Chicago and San Francisco. Id. at 730. 
340.  Id. at 730, 789. 
341. Id. at 789. 
342. Id. at 731, 789, 795. 
343. Id. at 795.  In his concurring opinion, Judge Littleton cited Boeing’s objection
to the extension for financial reasons as evidence of disproving that the carrier engaged 
in any fraud, conspiracy, or illegal acts.  Id. at 794–95 (Littleton, J., concurring). 
344. Id. at 789 (majority opinion). 
345.  Id. at 688, 730. 
346. Id. at 730. 
347.  McNary-Watres Act, ch. 223, sec. 2, § 6, 46 Stat. 259, 260 (1930). 
348. Id. at 259–260. 
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airmail contract.349  In consideration for a route certificate, the holder delivered
a performance bond to the Postal Service as a form of security.350 
As Lindbergh advocated, the lengthier certificates complemented the 
airlines’ ability to make sound fiscal decisions, affecting both equipment
upgrades and aircraft safety.351  Congress first recognized the necessity of
awarding air certificates for lengthier time periods when it passed the 
Kelly Amendment in 1928.352  The House committee report explained that
increasing certificate length “is necessary because of the fact . . . [airmail 
carriers] must necessarily invest large amounts of capital in equipment 
and operating expenses without receiving an adequate return under a short- 
term contract.”353  Before exchanging a carrier’s airmail contract for a route 
certificate, the carrier needed to prove it could provide a dependable service 
for a given time period.354 
Similarly, the McNary-Watres Congress also embraced this philosophy 
and recognized this unique industry required time to implement the substantial 
investment decisions affecting the capital, property, and equipment necessary 
for undertaking mail and passenger travel.355 Following the recently approved 
legislation, Brown exercised this option with all the plaintiff airlines at 
various times between May and October 1930, upgrading all five contracts to 
route certificates due to expire well after February 19, 1934.356 Complying 
with the statutory language, the plaintiffs provided the Postmaster General 
with proper surety.357 The 1930 Congress recognized and, as Brown understood,
the airlines invested considerably in everything from airplanes to ground 
facilities, and these same carriers made significant, long-term expenditures 
and therefore relied on lengthier route certificates to maintain economic 
viability.358 
As the technology evolved during this time period, airlines were constantly
replacing equipment while faced with twin economic and safety concerns.359 
349. Id.
 350. See id.
 351. See Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 743.
352.  Id. at 679–80 (citing Kelly Amendment, ch. 603, sec. 2, § 6, 45 Stat. 594, 594 
(1928)).
353.  Kelly Amendment, 45 Stat. at 2. 
354.  Id. 
355.  McNary-Watres Act, ch. 223, sec. 2, § 6, 46 Stat. 259, 259–260 (1930). 
356.  Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 655, 664, 670, 673, 675. 
357.  Id. at 656, 665, 670–71, 673, 676. 
358. See id. at 743. 
359. See id. at 742. 
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For example, Pacific Air Transport utilized single-engine airplanes when
transporting the mail along the west coast in 1926, but it upgraded its
inventory and purchased three Fokker and six Ford trimotor airplanes in 
1931.360  The trimotor airplanes were rapidly outdated and promptly 
replaced.361  By 1933, Pacific Air Transport purchased dual-motor Boeing 
airplanes functioning with greater speed and efficiency.362 Faced with similar 
economic considerations, technological advances, and safety concerns, the 
remaining two plaintiffs made similar decisions over the same time period.363 
As the parties facing these costly expenditures argued, sooner or later 
equipment became obsolete making “long-term contracts imperative.”364 
Extending the airmail contracts into certificates following two years of
proven service365 was beneficial and advantageous for both sides.  The
Postal Service and its customers benefited from a lengthier contractual 
term because it ensured dependable service following two years of proven 
performance.  Similarly, the carriers could rely on a steady income source 
over a lengthy time period, which was necessary for long term planning.  
To perform efficiently, effectively, and safely, operators must adjust to 
the evolving technology, and this time in history was not an exception, as 
all three plaintiff air carriers replaced their trimotor airplanes with dual-
motor airplanes between 1931 and 1933.366 
Significantly, other countries embraced the lengthier contractual period, 
revealing the standard industry practice.367 Recognizing the value of lengthier 
contracts, European countries typically awarded air carriers with contracts 
for a minimum of ten and up to twenty-five years to ensure effective long-
term planning.368 
4. Payment Schedule 
Also pursuant to the McNary-Watres legislation, Congress adopted 
Brown’s suggestion by restructuring the payment schedule.369  Brown believed
the previous rate per pound was costly, unjust, and invited questionable billing 




 363. See id.
 364. Berchtold, supra note 5, at 439.
365.  See McNary-Watres Act, ch. 223, sec. 2, § 6, 46 Stat. 259, 260 (1930). 
366.  Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 742. 
367.  See generally Berchtold, supra note 5, at 439. 
368.  Id. 
 369. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 690–91 (quoting McNary-Watres Act § 4, 46 Stat. at
259).
370.  See id. at 683. 
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mail weight, Brown proposed a payment system based on the amount of
the available transport space, which provided carriers the versatility to transport 
both passengers and the mail.371  Subsequently, the Black committee heavily 
criticized Brown’s payment system and the subsidies received by the 
airmail carriers.372 
In 1934, the collective cost to operate the domestic air transportation
system was approximately $25 million.373  Passenger revenues generated 
approximately $10 million and Congress allocated approximately $14 million 
in airmail subsidies, leaving the air carriers to absorb a $1 million deficit.374 
In this same year, however, the government generated an additional $9 
million in revenue from selling airmail stamps to the public, resulting in a
reduced $5 million subsidy.375  Although receiving intense public attention in
the Black commission proceedings, this $5 million subsidy was significantly 
less than the hundreds of millions of dollars in subsidies awarded to other 
commercial industries in 1934, according to William Berchtold, the 
Associated Press aviation editor at the time.376 
Both the Black commission and the Roosevelt administration failed to 
recognize congressional intentions involving the payment schedule, according 
to Berchtold.377  This legislation did not strive to create a cheaper airmail 
service—although this was the outcome—this legislation was “deliberately 
designed to build up an air transport system of financially sound and experienced 
companies which would . . . become self-supporting.”378  Although criticized,
the revised “weight-space” payment system allowed the Postmaster General 
the flexibility to “cut down” the rate of payments when necessary.379 
More than justifying Congress’s decision to implement a weight-space 
payment, Brown utilized this function over his tenure, and the cost of airmail 
declined from $1.09 per mile in 1929 to just $0.38 per mile in 1933.380 
371. Id. at 769. 
372. Berchtold, supra note 5, at 441. 
373. Id. at 442. 
374. Id.
 375. Id.
 376. Id. 
377. Id. at 441 (“Representative James M. Mead and Representative Clyde Kelly of 
the House Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads made elaborate studies on this subject 
long before the Black committee heard its first witness, but apparently economics have
been overthrown for political expediency.”). 
 
378. Id. at 445. 
379.  Id. at 441, 445 
 380. Id. at 445. 
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VI. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS ARGUMENT
The U.S. Court of Claims decided Pacific Air on December 7, 1942, 
several years after the Air Mail Affair concluded.381  The court held that
former Postmaster James Farley was justified when annulling the plaintiffs’ 
five route certificates and that his action did not amount to a breach of 
contract violation; however, the plaintiff airlines were entitled to payment 
for the airmail services provided during January and February 1934.382 
Finally, the court held that the defendant was not entitled to recover on its
counterclaim.383 
Originally, plaintiff airlines represented three separate corporations but 
later merged into one air transportation entity, the United group.384 The
three different air carriers collectively possessed five different route certificates 
when the Roosevelt administration terminated commercial mail delivery.385 
More specifically, Pacific Air Transport had an airmail certificate to fly
the mail on Route 8 between Seattle, Washington, and San Diego, California.386 
Boeing Air Transport had a certificate for mail delivery for both Route 18
between Chicago, Illinois, and San Francisco, California, and Route 5 between 
Salt Lake City, Utah, and Seattle, Washington.387  Likewise, National Air
Transport, Inc., had two certificates: Route 17 between New York, New York, 
and Chicago, Illinois, and Route 3 between Chicago, Illinois, and Dallas, 
Texas.388 
Although this argument is not addressed by the court, President Roosevelt
undoubtedly violated the separation of powers doctrine when he invalidated
the route certificates.389  Congressional authority over the Postal Service 
is constitutionally enshrined.390  Specifically, the Constitution empowers 
Congress “To establish Post Offices and post Roads,”391 and the courts
concluded, “. . . handling of the mails is a function of sovereignty conferred 
directly by the Constitution.”392  Further, the Supreme Court held that this
specific, enumerated congressional power included designating mail routes, 
identifying the physical locations of post offices as well as “all measures 
381.  Pacific Air Transport v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 649, 649 (1942). 
382.  Id. at 793. 
383. Id.
 384. Id. at 765. 
385. Id.
 386. Id. at 765–66. 
387. Id. at 766. 
388. Id.
 389. See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
390.  Id. 
 391. Id.
 392. E.g., Boeing Air Transp., Inc. v. Farley, 75 F.2d 765, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1935); see 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 381 (1819). 
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necessary to secure [the mail’s] safe and speedy transit, and the prompt 
delivery of its contents.”393 
Of course, Congress delegated much of this responsibility to the Postmaster 
General.394  Beginning with the Act of 1825, Congress authorized the
Postmaster General to “establish post-offices, and appoint postmasters, at 
all such places, as shall appear to him expedient.”395  The court held that
through legislation, Congress conferred to the Postmaster General the power 
to terminate a subordinate postmaster by eliminating a specific post office.396 
Even after deferring some duties to the Postmaster General, Congress
continued to exert its authority over the Postal Service by enacting legislation, 
defining what may be delivered, attributing weight specifications, and 
even setting the price.397  Significantly, courts consistently recognized that
“[t]he power possessed by Congress embraces the regulation of the entire 
postal system of the country.”398 
At the time the Air Mail Affair was unfolding, the Supreme Court 
consistently rejected Roosevelt’s attempts to usurp congressional powers.
Following Roosevelt’s decision to terminate the commercial air contracts
and well before the U.S. Court of Claims upheld this executive action, the 
Supreme Court invalidated different pieces of legislation that impermissibly 
transferred legislative powers to different executive agencies.399  In a 1935 
decision, Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, the Court invalidated a portion of 
the National Industrial Recovery Act because it incorrectly delegated a 
legislative function to the executive branch.400  When entering his Executive
order that regulated the oil industry, Roosevelt cited § 9(c) of the 
legislation, which authorized the President to prohibit the transportation 
of petroleum products produced in excess of any state law or regulation.401 
His Executive order directed the Secretary of the Interior to create agencies, 
establish boards, and appoint agents to oversee the oil industry based on 
393. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 732 (1877). 
394. See generally Ware v. United States, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 617, 631–32 (1867). 
395.  Act of Mar. 3, 1825, ch. 64, § 1, 4 Stat. 102, 102. 
396. Ware, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 633–34. 
397. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 732. 
398. Id.
 399. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 310–11 (1936); A.L.A. Schechter 
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935); Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 
430 (1935).
400. Pan. Ref. Co., 293 U.S. at 430–32. 
401. Id. at 406–07 (quoting National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, § 9(c), 48 Stat. 195,
200 (1933) (repealed 1966)). 
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Congress delegating this authority to the President.402  The Supreme Court 
found § 9(c) unconstitutional because Congress impermissibly transferred its 
law-making function to the executive branch.403  While finding that the
U.S. Constitution did not deny Congress the flexibility to address complex
issues through legislation, the Supreme Court further held that “Congress 
manifestly is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential 
legislative functions with which it is thus vested.”404 
Likewise, in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, the Supreme 
Court again invalidated federal legislation as an impermissible delegation 
of responsibility from Congress to the President.405  Under the National 
Industrial Recovery Act, Congress authorized the President to create a code 
protecting consumers, competitors, and employees as well as further the 
public interest while eliminating “unfair competitive practices.”406  However, 
the Court partly invalidated the legislation, holding that “[s]uch a delegation 
of legislative power is unknown to our law, and is utterly inconsistent with 
the constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress.”407 
Deciding Schechter the same year as rendering Panama Refining Co. v. 
Ryan and during the height of the Great Depression, the Court further held 
that the dire economic conditions neither enhanced constitutional powers 
nor negated the congressional authority to make all laws, which shall be 
necessary and proper for implementing its power.408  “The Congress is not
permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential legislative 
functions with which it is thus vested.”409  The very next year in 1936 the Court
invalidated the Guffey Coal Act because it again improperly delegated 
legislative power to the executive branch in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.410 
402. Id. (quoting Exec. Order No. 6204: Power Given to the Secretary of the Interior to
Enforce the Preceding Order, 2 PUB. PAPERS 282 (July 14, 1933)). 
403. Id. at 430. 
404. Id. at 421. 
405.  295 U.S. 495, 541–42 (1935). 
406.  Id. at 534 (citing National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, § 3, 48 Stat. 195, 196 
(1933) (repealed 1966)). 
407. Id. at 537. 
408. Id. at 528–29; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.18 (“To make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers 
vested by this Constitution . . . .”). 
409. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 529. 
410. 298 U.S. 238, 238, 311 (1936). Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, A.L.A. Schechter 
Poultry Corp. v. United States, and Carter v. Carter Coal Co. triggered one of the most 
significant events in Supreme Court history.  After the Supreme Court invalidated much 
of his New Deal legislation in these holdings, Roosevelt appealed to the people and introduced his 
plan to pack the Court in a March 9, 1937, radio broadcast.  O’BRIEN, supra note 113, 
at 62.  Among other judicial reforms, Roosevelt advocated to increase the number of 
justices from nine to fifteen.  Id.  When any federal judge or Supreme Court Justice reached 
age seventy but chose to forgo retirement, then another jurist would be appointed under the 
104
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Perhaps the case from this time period most factually similar to the Air 
Mail Affair is United States v. Pan-American Petroleum Co.411  Decided by
a federal district court in California in 1925, this case presented both 
comparable facts and a similar legal issue.412  The court found that Secretary 
of the Interior Albert Fall initially solicited, and then utilized, a Presidential 
Executive order to fraudulently award leases and contracts to defendant 
Pan-America Petroleum Company in the U.S. Naval Petroleum Reserve 
without observing a competitive bidding process.413  The court invalidated
these leases and contracts because Fall negotiated these agreements for 
personal benefit and because Congress did not vest any specific power in 
the President to develop the naval reserve lands.414 
Between April and December 1922, the parties entered a series of 
agreements where defendant constructed storage facilities at Pearl Harbor 
and exchanged the crude oil located in the naval reserves in California for 
oil stored at the Pearl Harbor location.415  In Pacific Air, the government
alleged the airlines violated a federal statute by conspiring to prevent others 
from bidding on government contracts.416  Similarly, in Pan-American 
Petroleum Co., the government accused the defendant of engaging in fraudulent 
conduct.417  Ultimately, the court agreed with the fraud allegation, finding 
that Secretary Fall negotiated the agreements in bad faith after compelling 
evidence surfaced that defendant’s executive director Edward Doheny 
gave Fall a $100,000 payment.418 
Roosevelt plan.  Id. at 65.  Later that same spring, the Senate defeated Roosevelt’s court-
packing legislation but only after one of the court’s more centrist Justices changed course
and began voting to validate New Deal legislation.  See id. at 128.  Legal analysts referred
to this crucial change in vote as the “switch-in-time-that-saved-nine” as well as an event 
tipping the court in favor of Roosevelt’s policies.  Id. at 62.  Between 1937 and 1943,
Roosevelt enjoyed the opportunity to appoint eight justices, including the outspoken Brown
critic, Senator Hugo Black.  Id. at 1041. 
411.  6 F.2d 43 (S.D. Cal. 1925), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 9 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 
1926), aff’d, 273 U.S. 456 (1927). 
412.  See id. at 43, 53, 80. 
413.  Id. at 53, 80–81, 88. 
414. Id. at 56, 80–81. 
415. Id. at 48. 
416. Pac. Air Transp. v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 649, 767 (1942) (quoting Rev. Stat.
§ 3950 (1872) (codified as amended at 39 U.S.C. § 6421 (repealed 1970))). 
417.  Pan-Am. Petrol., 6 F.2d at 50. 
418.  Id. at 65, 80–81. 
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Evidence of fraud is not the only reason the court invalidated the Pan-
American contracts and leases.419  Unlike Pacific Air, the court identified
the separation of powers problem and concluded there was an improper
transfer of power.420  More specifically, the court held that the President 
lacked the legal authority to transfer a power delegated by Congress from 
one cabinet member to another.421  When facilitating his effort to steer the
contract or leases to Pan-American Petroleum Co., Fall persuaded President 
Harding to sign an Executive order designating the Secretary of the Interior 
as administrator to the naval reserve instead of the Secretary of the Navy.422 
Fall used the Harding Executive order as authorization to negotiate with
parties and to enter into contracts and leases involving the naval petroleum 
reserves.423  However, the Harding Executive order conflicted with legislation 
designating the Secretary of the Navy as administrator to the naval reserves.424 
The same section of the Constitution empowering Congress to exercise 
authority over the post office also empowers Congress “[t]o provide and 
maintain a Navy.”425  When Harding signed his Executive order designating
another cabinet official as occupying administrative responsibility for the 
naval reserves, he illegally transferred a power delegated to the Secretary 
of the Navy by Congress.426 In short, an Executive order cannot reverse 
congressional action rooted in constitutional authority.427 
[I]t must be held that Congress did not intend that some other branch of the 
government could transfer this power to some other officer, or divest the officer
in whom Congress reposed the authority of the power which Congress has conferred 
upon such officer exclusively.  No branch of the government but Congress can divest
or transfer the power so delegated.428 
Decided nearly ten years earlier and potentially persuasive to the Pacific
Air court, the Pan-American Petroleum holding is a harbinger that the 
latter court chose to ignore.429  The factual circumstances closely resemble 
the events unfolding in the Air Mail Affair.  The Pan-American Petroleum 
court was confronted with the constitutionality of an Executive order that 
419. See id. at 88. 
420. Id. at 87. 
421. Id.
 422. Id. at 50. 
423. See id. at 52. 
424. Id. at 87. 
425. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13. 
426.  Pan-Am. Petrol., 6 F.2d at 87–88. 
427. Id. at 87. 
428. Id.
429.  See generally Pac. Air Transp. v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 649 (1942). 
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transferred administrative responsibility between executive departments 
when it conflicted with the congressional delegation of power.430 
Similarly, Roosevelt entered an Executive order directing both the 
departments of war and commerce to assist the Postmaster General with mail 
delivery on February 9, 1934.431  Roosevelt did so when the Constitution 
delegated the postal duty to Congress and without congressional legislation 
authorizing his Presidential interference.432  Admittedly, Congress passed 
legislation authorizing the President to direct the U.S. Department of War 
to assist with mail delivery, but this was several weeks later and well after 
Roosevelt acted.433  With such a similar factual scenario, plaintiff airlines
enjoyed a powerful separation of powers argument after considering the 
Pan-American Petroleum holding.434 
Applying both the Constitution and relevant case law,435 the Pacific Air
court could have reasonably found that Roosevelt violated separation of 
powers when he entered and signed Executive Order 6591.436  Significantly,
he instructed both the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of War 
to assist the Postmaster General with the airmail delivery.437  Specifically,
the President ordered the Secretary of War to provide airplanes, landing 
fields, additional equipment, and even pilots as well as additional employees 
“required for the transportation of mail, during the present emergency.”438 
First, Roosevelt was arguably assuming authority over powers delegated 
to Congress by the Constitution.439  Just as the Constitution assigned to
Congress the postal power, it likewise delegated to Congress the power to 
“declare War” as well as to “make Rules for the Government and Regulation 
of the land and naval Forces.”440  Admittedly, Congress delegated some
430. Pan-Am. Petrol., 6 F.2d at 87. 
431. Exec. Order No. 6591: The Army Temporarily Flies the Mail, 3 PUB. PAPERS 93, 93
(Feb. 9, 1934). 
432. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7. 
433. See generally Act of Mar. 27, 1934, ch. 100, § 1, 48 Stat. 508, 508. 
434. See Pan-Am. Petrol., 6 F.2d at 88. 
435. See generally, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 291 (1936); A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537, 550 (1935); Pan. Ref. Co. v. 
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935); Pan-Am. Petrol., 6 F.2d at 87. 
436. See Exec. Order No. 6591, 3 PUB. PAPERS at 93. 
437. Id.
 438. Id.
 439. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 7, 13.
 440. Id. at cls. 11, 14.
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authority to a Secretary of War,441 just as it vested certain responsibilities 
in the Postmaster General and a Secretary of the Navy.442 
However, canceling the airmail contracts was Roosevelt’s decision, not 
the Postmaster General’s decision.443  By doing so, he was usurping the
postal power.  The timing is critical.  On February 9, 1934, Farley signed Post 
Office Department Order No. 4959, officially terminating the multiple 
airmail contracts and certificates effective February 19, 1934, further 
prohibiting the affected  carriers from transporting the mail.444  However, 
Farley signed his order on the same day that Roosevelt entered his Executive 
order and immediately after he participated in a conference at the White 
House.445 
Additional evidence points to Roosevelt taking exclusive responsibility 
for invalidating the airmail contracts. The Executive order language is
revealing. In the very first sentence of his order, Roosevelt acknowledged
that the airmail contracts are invalidated.446  Later in the same order, he
directed other departments to both assist and provide specific, multiple 
resources to aid Postmaster General Farley with mail delivery.447  Roosevelt’s
actions were even more telling.  Significantly, Roosevelt selected February 
19 as the air carrier’s final day for transporting the mail.448  He did so after
consulting staff and even overruling the Postmaster General, who requested 
postponing this event until early June.449 
It is almost universally recognized that Roosevelt canceled the airmail 
contracts. A plethora of sources identify Roosevelt, not the Postmaster
General, as steering this action, with Roosevelt directing Farley to terminate 
the relationship with the airlines and further corroborating the reality that
the President replaced the Postmaster General’s decision-making with his 
own.450  Even at the time, this was the public perception.  The day following
the fateful decision, The Washington Post read: “Charging fraud and collusion, 
President Roosevelt yesterday directed the cancellation of all air mail
441. Act of Sept. 19, 1890, ch. 907, § 12, 26 Stat. 426, 455; Phila. Co. v. Stimson, 
223 U.S. 605, 615 (1912). 
442. See United States v. Pan-Am. Petrol. Co., 6 F.2d 43, 88 (S.D. Cal. 1925), aff’d 
in part and rev’d in part, 9 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1926), aff’d, 273 U.S. 456 (1927). 
443. Exec. Order No. 6591: The Army Temporarily Flies the Mail, 3 PUB. PAPERS
93, 93 (Feb. 9, 1934). 
444.  Pac. Air Transp. v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 649, 743–45 (1942). 
445. Berchtold, supra note 5, at 443. 
446.  Exec. Order No. 6591, 3 PUB. PAPERS at 93. 
447. Id.
 448. See Werrell, supra note 10, at 16. 
449. BLACK, supra note 11, at 321; Werrell, supra note 10, at 15. 
450. See, e.g., BLACK, supra note 11, at 321; Ravich, supra note 20, at 7; Rubin, supra
note 6, at 571; Shiner, supra note 122, at 83; Werrell, supra note 10, at 14; Mathieson, 
supra note 124, at 1020 n.18. 
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contracts with domestic companies—thus reshaping, if not collapsing, the 
Nation’s network of private transport concerns.”451  Although the agreements 
were negotiated and entered between the carriers and the Postmaster 
General, Roosevelt inserted himself and directed the contract termination. 
Second, the court could understandably find that Roosevelt violated 
separation of powers when he transferred responsibility from one executive 
department to another.452  The President can transfer responsibilities among 
various cabinet departments.453  However, even in “peace time” the President 
cannot transfer powers among cabinet members contrary to a specific 
congressional designation.454  In other words, Congress delegated the
Postmaster General, not the Secretary of War, as responsible for the postal 
duty.455 
In Pan-American Petroleum, the court invalidated the contractual 
agreement because the Harding Executive order transferred authority over
the petroleum reserves from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of the
Interior, which directly conflicted with congressional legislation making 
the Secretary of the Navy responsible for this task.456  Similarly, Roosevelt
transferred, or at the minimum assigned, some amount of mail responsibility 
to both the Secretary of War and Secretary of Commerce without congressional 
authorization.457 Admittedly, Congress later approved this action involving 
the Secretary of the War, but much after the fact.458  Perhaps recognizing
Roosevelt exceeded his constitutional mandate, the Democratic Congress 
moved to protect his overreach.459  Using language virtually mirroring
Roosevelt’s previous Executive order, Congress authorized the Secretary 
of War to assist “the Postmaster General [with] such airplanes, landing 
fields, pilots, and other employees and equipment” when delivering the mail, 
but not until March 27 or a time well after the President canceled the 
contracts.460  Also, applying the reasoning of Pan-American Petroleum, 
451. Dure, supra note 125, at A1. 
452. See United States v. Pan-Am. Petrol. Co., 6 F.2d 43, 87 (S.D. Cal. 1925), aff’d 
in part and rev’d in part, 9 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1926), aff’d, 273 U.S. 456 (1927). 
453. Id.
 454. Id.
 455. See id.
 456. Id. at 87–88. 
457. See Exec. Order No. 6591: The Army Temporarily Flies the Mail, 3 PUB.
PAPERS 93, 93 (Feb. 9, 1934). 
458. See Act of Mar. 27, 1934, ch. 100, § 1, 48 Stat. 508, 508. 
459. See id.
 460. Id.; Exec. Order No. 6591, 3 PUB. PAPERS at 93. 
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Roosevelt’s decision to transfer the constitutionally enshrined mail power 
to other departments—even with the benefit of congressional approval—
was unconstitutional.461 
Third, Roosevelt acted contrary to congressional intent when considering
the existing legislation. The McNary-Watres Act directed the Postmaster 
General to act when and if a carrier violated the contractual relationship, 
excluding any need for Presidential involvement.462  The statute clarified 
the termination procedure, if the Postmaster General chose to act.463 The
statutory language is telling and specific.464  The statute outlined the 
cancellation procedures but, more importantly, emphasized that the
Postmaster General must act to nullify the contract.465  Instead, Roosevelt 
made the decision, acting contrary to the Constitution and congressional 
intent.466 
Fourth, the Pacific Air court could also find that Roosevelt usurped
congressional authority because he seized a constitutionally delegated power.  
According to the case law, courts are even more deferential to powers 
specifically enumerated in the Constitution and the branch entrusted with 
these specific duties.467  Arguably, the Court elevated the importance of a
power specified in the Constitution and emphasized the significance.
Specifically, “[w]hen the power to establish post-offices and post-roads 
[is] surrendered to the Congress it [is] as a complete power, and the grant 
carrie(s) with it the right to exercise all powers.”468 
Undoubtedly, Roosevelt justified his aggressive action as a necessary
response to the dire economic conditions.  At this point in history, the 
country was mired in the Great Depression with many banks and businesses 
languishing in bankruptcy and astronomical unemployment stretching from 
the urban core to the family farm.  Even at the risk of exceeding constitutional
guidelines, Roosevelt likely considered his strong executive leadership as 
the cure to rectifying what he viewed as the infectious greed of the private 
sector that was undoubtedly contributing to the ills of the country.  Not 
so, said the Court in a 1935 decision.469  Dire economic conditions do not 
expand constitutional powers.470 
461. See Pan-Am. Petrol., 6 F.2d at 88. 
462.  McNary-Watres Act, ch. 223, sec. 2, § 6, 46 Stat. 259, 259–60 (1930). 
463. See id. at 260. 
464. See id. at 259–60. 
465. Id. at 260. 
466. See Exec. Order No. 6591: The Army Temporarily Flies the Mail, 3 PUB. PAPERS
93, 93 (Feb. 9, 1934). 
467. See, e.g., In re Rapier, 143 U.S. 110, 134 (1892). 
468. Id.
 469. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935).
470. See id. at 528. 
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A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States was one of the critical 
cases striking down executive action from this time period,471 providing
compelling arguments about the dangers of executive overreach.  The 
Court was unpersuaded by the government’s position that “the statute 
authorizing the adoption of codes must be viewed in the light of the grave 
national crisis with which Congress was confronted” or the argument that 
the poor economic conditions invited increasing levels of Presidential 
power.472  The Court rejected this reasoning, holding:
But the argument necessarily stops short of an attempt to justify action which 
lies outside the sphere of constitutional authority.  Extraordinary conditions do
not create or enlarge constitutional power.  The Constitution established a
national government with powers deemed to be adequate, as they have proved to
be both in war and peace, but these powers of the national government are limited
by the constitutional grants.  Those who act under these grants are not at liberty to
transcend the imposed limits because they believe that more or different power is
necessary.473 
In short, the Constitution is uncompromising regardless of the economic
conditions, and governmental authority remains constrained by constitutional
guidelines. Additional legal authority from this time period consistently 
rejected executive overreach, as well as exposed examples of the executive
branch encroaching on the terrain of the legislature.474  In fact,  A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. reasserted the uncompromising principle of separation 
of powers, or the sanctity of a well-defined government, operating within 
the framework of the Constitution and under three separate branches of 
government as first defined in Marbury v. Madison.475 While universally
praised in legal circles and credited for developing the concept of judicial 
review by constitutional law scholars, Marbury v. Madison is the seminal 
case establishing the role of the judiciary as an equal branch of 
government.476 
471. See id. at 551. 
472. Id. at 528. 
473. Id. at 528–29 (footnote omitted). 
474.  See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 317 (1936) (Hughes, J., 
concurring); Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935). 
475.  A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 528–29; see Marbury v. Madison, 
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 167 (1803). 
476. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 173, 176–77, 179. 
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Authored by Chief Justice John Marshall,477 Marbury v. Madison defined 
the roles of the courts and asserted the judicial obligation to review 
governmental action.478  More specifically, Chief Justice Marshall wrote: 
The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those limits may
not be mistaken, or forgotten, the [C]onstitution is written.  To what purpose are 
powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if
these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained?479 
VII. THE DUE PROCESS ARGUMENT
Arguably the Roosevelt administration was premature, shortsighted,
and inequitable when moving to annul the contracts under § 3950 instead
of acting under the contractual language requiring notice and hearing. While
a more pedantic legal analysis of the Roosevelt decision recognizes the 
conflict existing under separation of powers, Lindbergh’s criticism was 
more compelling, straightforward, and direct: the President and the 
government violated due process of law, specifically “condemn[ed] . . . 
commercial aviation without just trial . . . [and without] the opportunity
of a hearing.”480 
On that same day President Roosevelt entered his Executive order directing 
the Army to fly the mail, Postmaster General Farley entered Post Office 
Department Order No. 4959, terminating multiple airmail contracts effective
February 19, 1934.481  As justification, the administration cited § 3950, 
which prevented the federal government from contracting with any entity 
conspiring to “prevent the making of any bid for carrying the mail,” thus 
477. Besides writing this landmark opinion, Chief Justice John Marshall was
uniquely involved in the factual circumstances surrounding this case.  See GERALD GUNTHER, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 10 (David L. Shapiro et al. eds., 12th ed. 1991).  As President John 
Adams’s Secretary of State, John Marshall signed and sealed the judicial commission 
belonging to William Marbury, the lead plaintiff in Marbury v. Madison. Id.  On February 27, 
1801, or less than a week before then-President John Adams concluded his presidency and 
President Thomas Jefferson began his term, Congress passed legislation authorizing the 
President to appoint justices of the peace in the District of Columbia.  Id.  Accordingly, Adams 
appointed Marbury on March 2 with his nomination subsequently approved by the 
Senate the following day.  Id.  However, the judicial commission was not delivered to Marbury 
before newly elected President Thomas Jefferson and his new secretary of state, James 
Madison, assumed office on March 4.  Id.  Considering their affiliation with the rival 
political party, Jefferson and Madison refused to honor the Marbury appointment along with 
others.  Id.  Interestingly enough, Marshall’s brother, James Marshall, was responsible for 
delivering the commissions, but unsuccessfully dispatched all of them due to the 
volume of late appointments in the final hours of the Adams administration.  Id. at 10– 
11. 
478. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177–78. 
479.  Id. at 176. 
480. Libby, supra note 18, at 45. 
481.  Pac. Air Transp. v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 649, 744 (1942). 
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negating the necessity of notice and hearing.482  Although previous
legislation and even the airmail contracts required notice and an opportunity 
to respond, the Roosevelt administration hoped to dodge due process 
guarantees when acting under § 3950.483  Additionally, Farley sent a
telegram directly to the affected airlines confirming the cancellation and 
again cited § 3950 as reason for terminating the airmail contracts.484 
Many of the affected air carriers, including the plaintiffs in Pacific Air, 
responded vigorously.  On February 16, Pacific Air Transport, Boeing Air 
Transport, and National Air Transport sent a letter to the Postmaster General 
protesting the cancellation, requesting the suspension of the order as well 
as requesting a hearing on the matter.485  On that same day, United Air
Lines also wrote the Postmaster General, alleging that the cancellation order 
was based on misinformation and requested a hearing.486  After receiving
no reply, United Air Lines again reasserted its right to a hearing on March 
7, notifying the Postmaster General that the carriers were losing in excess 
of $250,000 monthly.487  Not until March 27,488 the Postmaster General 
finally responded that the affected carriers could submit a written brief, 
which would be considered by the post office.489  On April 14, the carriers
jointly filed a brief, but the Postmaster General did not respond.490 
A. Contractual Language Included a Grievance Procedure 
After siding with the Roosevelt administration to find a Revised Statutes
§ 3950 violation that involved a complicated, convoluted factual scenario,
the Pacific Air court overlooked a more obvious, fundamental concern.
The contracts and subsequent airmail certificates required a notice and
482. Id. at 752 (quoting Rev. Stat. § 3950 (1872) (codified as amended at 39 U.S.C.
§ 6421 (repealed 1970))). 
483. Id. at 656 (quoting McNary-Watres Act, ch. 223, sec. 2, § 6, 46 Stat. 259, 260 
(1930)).
484. See id. at 744–45. 
485. Id. at 745. 
486. Id. at 746. 
487. Id.
488. Interestingly, or ironically, this is the same day a new, heavily Democratic Congress 
enacted legislation mirroring the language of Roosevelt’s Executive Order 6591 and 
specifically authorizing the U.S. Department of War to assist with the airmail.  See Act of 
Mar. 27, 1934, ch. 100, § 1, 48 Stat. 508, 508. 
489. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 746. 
490. Id.
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response period in direct, specific language.491  When canceling the
agreement, the Postmaster General should have provided written notice as 
well as provided the carrier with a forty-five-day period to show cause or 
an opportunity to respond.492  Roosevelt and his administration violated
this contractual requirement and effectively denied due process guarantees. 
Admittedly, Farley sent a telegram to the carriers on February 9 announcing 
that the airmail agreements would be terminated within ten days, although 
the contractual language required written notice.493  However, his telegram
did not outline a grievance procedure and certainly did not offer the air 
carriers an opportunity to be heard about the annulment.494  After receiving
multiple inquiries and requests to be heard, Farley informed the affected 
parties on March 27 that they could submit a brief, which would be “carefully 
considered.”495  However, this was well after the Air Corps assumed 
responsibility for transporting the mail and the air carriers were displaced 
from their property interest.496  The Roosevelt administration ignored any
and all requests to reconsider the decision and denied the airlines an 
opportunity to contest the decision prior to February 19.497 
Besides their substantial investment in equipment, real estate, and 
infrastructure, the plaintiffs also possessed property rights in their airmail
contracts. A well-established legal principle, firmly entrenched in precedent, 
is that a valid contract is considered property.498  When abolishing the contracts
without notice and hearing, the Roosevelt administration was confiscating 
this property interest.  Due process prohibits taking private property without 
a grievance process, specifically notice of this intention and an opportunity 
to respond.499 
By denying the air carriers’ due process rights clearly specified within 
the four corners of the written agreement, the Pacific Air court also rejected 
the consistent, frequently reaffirmed congressional preference for a grievance 
procedure.500  The notice and response period is consistently and persistently 
required, pursuant to statute.501  Prior to McNary-Watres, Congress passed 
the Kelly Amendment, requiring the Postmaster General to provide the air 
491. Id. at 656 (quoting McNary-Watres Act, ch. 223, sec. 2, § 6, 46 Stat. 259, 260 
(1930)).
492.  Id. (quoting McNary-Watres Act, sec. 2, § 6, 46 Stat. at 259–60). 
493.  Id. at 743–44. 
494. See id.
 495. Id. at 746. 
496. See id. at 743–46. 
497. Id. at 745–46. 
498.  Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934). 
499.  See id. 
 500. 
501.  See, e.g., Lynch, 292 U.S. at 579. 
See Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 789; Lynch, 292 U.S. at 579. 
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carrier with a sixty-day period to respond to any written cancellation
notice.502 While McNary-Watres changed certain elements of the preexisting 
legislation, such as the length of the response period, the latter legislation 
equally embraced the grievance procedure, further reinforcing its 
importance.503 
Even the Roosevelt administration seemed to recognize its error in
denying due process to the certificate holders while clinging to the alleged 
§ 3950 violation.  After receiving numerous inquiries challenging the 
annulment decision, the administration relented on March 27 and 
announced that it would allow the airlines to submit a written brief.504  At
this point, the Roosevelt administration seemed to realize that their conduct 
resembled a taking without following a legitimate procedure. They had
not complied with the contractual language, and for the first time, they 
seemed to realize their conduct resembled a due process violation. 
If the Roosevelt administration remained intent on extricating the 
commercial airlines from airmail delivery, the more equitable cause of 
action would have been to utilize the escape clause existing in the contractual
language. The Postmaster General could terminate any certificate due to 
any “willful neglect” by the holder to “carry out any rules, regulations, or 
orders made for his guidance.”505  In fact, the Post Office Solicitor General 
identified the breach of contract course of action, along with others, as a 
viable option.506 When assailing the air carriers, the Roosevelt administration 
alleged that plaintiffs went beyond violating § 3950 and additionally asserted 
that they were “guilty of other corrupt and unlawful conduct which justified 
defendant canceling the route certificates.”507  Corrupt and unlawful activity
arguably falls within the scope of conduct qualifying as a breach because 
it contradicts the government’s rules and regulations.  As a more equitable 
alternative, the Roosevelt administration could have pressed for termination 
by pursuing a breach of contract action, thus preserving plaintiffs’ due 
process rights. 
502.  Kelly Amendment, ch. 603, sec. 2, § 6, 45 Stat. 594, 594 (1928). 
503. See McNary-Watres Act, ch. 223, sec. 2, § 6, 46 Stat. 259, 260 (1930); Kelly
Amendment, 45 Stat. at 594. 
504. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 746. 
505. McNary-Watres Act, sec. 2, § 6, 46 Stat. at 260; Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 656. 
506. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 747–48. 
507. Id. at 767. 
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B. Due Process Rights Exist Under the Fifth Amendment 
Prior to the Pacific Air decision, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia held that the plaintiff airlines enjoyed a due 
process right under the Fifth Amendment in Boeing Air Transport, Inc. v. 
Farley.508  Decided in 1935, immediately following the Air Mail Affair,
the court opined that § 3950 would be unconstitutional without a notice 
and hearing requirement.509 In its petition, Boeing Air Transport requested 
the court prevent the Roosevelt administration from enforcing the February 
9 Executive order.510  Ultimately, the court granted the government’s
motion to dismiss only because the court found that jurisdiction on this issue 
properly rested with the U.S. Court of Claims.511 
The Court of Appeals’s analysis is illuminating.  The court considered
both the question of whether or not the Roosevelt administration could
annul contracts without notice and hearing as well as the additional issue 
of whether the government could impose statutory penalties while preventing
the plaintiff airlines from bidding on future contracts.512  The Fifth Amendment
of the Constitution specifies that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”513  Before concluding 
proper jurisdiction rests elsewhere, the court considered Roosevelt’s argument
that § 3950 “does not expressly provide for notice and hearing” when
annulling government contracts.514  The court disagreed, concluding that
a notice and hearing provision was implied in the § 3950 statute, making 
the statute unconstitutional without providing a grievance process.515 
Further, the court reasoned that denying plaintiffs their right to notice 
and hearing equated to a taking of property, thus violating the Fifth
Amendment.516  Contracts are property according to the court, and the 
government could not disregard its obligation to comply with the Fifth 
Amendment, even as a party to a case.517  Signaling the significance of due 
process and its revered standing within the Constitution, the court further 
referenced the language in Ochoa v. Hernandez Morales: 
508.  Boeing Air Transp., Inc. v. Farley, 75 F.2d 765, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1935). 
509.  Id. 
 510. Id. at 766. 
511. Id. at 768. 
512. Id. at 766. 
513. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
 514. Boeing Air Transp., 75 F.2d at 767. 
515.  Id.  
516. Id.
 517. Id. (citing Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579–80 (1934)). 
116
CLARK_57-1_POST CLARK PAGES (DO NOT DELETE) 3/25/2020 10:56 AM     
 
    
 

























[VOL. 57:  61, 2020] “The Spirit of” Due Process 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Without the guaranty of “due process” the right of private property cannot be 
said to exist, in the sense in which it is known to our laws. The principle, known
to the common law before Magna Charta, was embodied in that Charter . . . and 
has been recognized since the Revolution as among the safest foundations of our 
institutions.  Whatever else may be uncertain about the definition of the term
“due process of law,” all authorities agree that it inhibits the taking of one man’s 
property and giving it to another, contrary to settled usages and modes of procedure, 
and without notice or an opportunity for a hearing.518 
When the court concluded that § 3950 implied a grievance provision,
Roosevelt could not deny the air carriers notice and an opportunity to
respond regardless of the statutory language, according to the court.519 
Admittedly, it did not address the question whether Roosevelt acted properly 
when breaching the contracts, but clarified that he could not terminate
these contracts without providing the air carriers with a grievance process.520 
By doing so, he offended due process and denied the air carriers their rights
under the Fifth Amendment. 
Admittedly § 3950 called for the Postmaster General to annul the 
contracts following evidence undermining the integrity of the bidding
process without any notice or hearing, but the Boeing Air court concluded 
that this grievance process cannot be ignored.521  Without providing a
notice and hearing opportunity, the statute was unconstitutional according 
to the court.522  In sum, Roosevelt’s actions deprived the air carriers of a
recognizable property interest by ending the contracts.  Interestingly, the
court described the administration’s action as resembling a “breach,” not 
an “annulment” of the airmail contracts under § 3950.523  Conceding
jurisdiction on this issue existed elsewhere, the Boeing Air court acknowledged 
another court must decide if the breach—or the Roosevelt decision to 
cancel the airmail certificates—was proper or improper.524 
Precedent from this time supports the Boeing Air court’s reasoning. In 
its opinions, the Supreme Court remained vigilant, frequently upholding
due process as necessary to preserve individual rights, regulate government
conduct, and guard against government abuse.  In another opinion from 
518. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Ochoa v. Hernandez y Morales, 230 U.S. 139, 161 
(1913)).
519. See id. at 767–68. 
520. See id. at 768. 
521. Id. at 767. 
522. Id.
523. Id. at 768. 
524. Id. 
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this time period, Blackmer v. United States, the Court defined due process 
as “requir[ing] appropriate notice of the judicial action and an opportunity
to be heard.”525  In this case, a lower court found the petitioner in contempt 
of court, fined him, and ordered the judgment satisfied following the 
seizure of his property.526  When upholding the lower court’s judgment,
the Supreme Court further opined “[t]he requirement of due process . . . 
is satisfied by suitable notice and adequate opportunity to appear and to 
be heard.”527 
Likewise, in Ballard v. Hunter the Supreme Court upheld an Arkansas 
statute allowing notice by publication prior to selling a nonresident’s property 
due to unpaid taxes but cited additional case law requiring “respect . . . 
528 [as] to the cause and object of the taking” when deciding due process issues.
In the due process case from 1907, plaintiffs asserted that the Arkansas 
statute discriminated against them as nonresidents of the state because it 
allowed different forms of notice for resident versus nonresident landowners 
prior to selling a property for nonpayment of taxes.529 
When upholding the statute, the Supreme Court held that a state is
restricted by boundaries and cannot always manage to personally serve an
out-of-state resident, so constructive service, or service by publication, is 
appropriate.530  Decided before Pacific Air as relevant precedent, the Court 
found that the essential requirement for due process is an “opportunity for 
a hearing and defense, but no fixed procedure is demanded.”531 “The process
or proceedings may be adapted to the nature of the case.”532  Further, the 
Court recognized that the government is entrusted with certain taxing powers 
or even the power to take property through eminent domain, but fairness 
requires a process for the individual to be heard in response to these
actions.533  When applied fairly, proportionately, and appropriately, this is
due process but, conversely, if this process becomes “arbitrary, oppressive 
and unjust,” it is not due process of law.534 
525.  Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932). 
526.  Id. at 433. 
527. Id. at 440. 
528. Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 242–43, 255–56 (1907) (quoting Davidson v.
New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 107 (1878) (Bradley, J., concurring)).
529.  Id. at 254, 264. 
530. Id. at 254. 
531. Id. at 255. 
532. Id.
 533. Id. at 255–56 (citing Davidson, 96 U.S. at 104–05, 107). 
534. Id. at 256 (citing Davidson, 96 U.S. at 107 (Bradley, J., concurring)). 
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The Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized the importance of offering 
notice and hearing opportunities prior to taking property.535 The Boeing 
Air court’s decision absorbed the Supreme Court’s rationale and applied 
this concept when considering the due process issues in the Air Mail Affair,536 
unlike the Pacific Air court, which appeared to disregard this precedent
when making a decision.537  While recognizing its jurisdictional limitations, 
the Boeing Air court concluded that Roosevelt violated due process.538 
Besides investing in expensive equipment, property, and even infrastructure,
the plaintiffs possessed a recognizable property interest in the airmail
contracts or route certificates according to the courts.539  Any taking of
property required due process of law and Roosevelt violated this requirement 
when he annulled the certificates without notice or hearing.540  He acted
under the authority of § 3950 but at least one court found this statute 
unconstitutional without a grievance process.541 
Additionally, the contract length elevated the value of the plaintiffs’
property and enhanced their damages.  After two years of proven, capable 
service, each plaintiff or their predecessor in interest received an airmail
certificate for an extended number of years.542  Arguably, this lengthy
contractual term multiplied the revenue and increased the plaintiff’s property 
interest.  Under these circumstances, a taking of property without some form 
of notice and hearing seems completely contrary to court precedent.543 
Considering the plaintiffs enjoyed a property interest in a written agreement 
extending over as many as ten years, there was much to lose.  This taking 
without a hearing amounts to a property loss compounded over multiple
years in multiple amounts. To sanction the Roosevelt action without allowing
some form of a grievance process seems contrary to prevalent court precedent 
and fundamentally unfair.
535. E.g., Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932); Ochoa v. Hernandez y
Morales, 230 U.S. 139, 161 (1913); Ballard, 204 U.S. at 255–56 (citing Davidson, 96 U.S. at 
104–05).
536.  Boeing Air Transp., Inc. v. Farley, 75 F.2d 765, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1935). 
537. See Pac. Air Transp. v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 649, 789 (1942). 
538. Boeing Air Transp., 75 F.2d at 767–68. 
539. Id. at 767 (citing Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934)). 
540. See supra Section VII.A. 
541. Boeing Air Transp., 75 F.2d at 767. 
542. McNary-Watres Act, ch. 223, sec. 2, § 6, 46 Stat. 259, 259–60 (1930); see Pac. Air
Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 654. 
543. See Boeing Air Transp., 75 F.2d at 767 (citing Lynch, 292 U.S. at 579). 
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The factual circumstances offer an equally compelling narrative.  The 
Roosevelt administration abruptly canceled thirty-four total airmail contracts 
with more than thirty different companies on February 9.544  Of that number,
thirty-one were awarded between 1925 and 1927 under competitive bidding 
procedures where there were three to nine competitors for each contract.545 
The remaining three were awarded in 1930 to the lowest responsible bidder.546 
Summarily, the Pacific Air decision involved only three carriers and their 
respective five collective airmail routes.  All five airmail contracts were 
initially awarded following an open, competitive bidding process pursuant 
to statute.547  Significantly, all five airmail contracts were initially awarded 
between 1926 and 1927,548 well before the May 1930 spoils conferences 
and even prior to Walter Brown’s appointment as Postmaster General on 
March 4, 1929.549  Considering the five contracts were awarded following 
an open, competitive bidding process and increased in value to multiple 
year agreements, Roosevelt’s move to terminate the succeeding air certificates 
within ten days and without a grievance procedure resembled an “arbitrary, 
oppressive, and unjust” process as described by earlier courts.550 
VIII. MORE RECENT USE OF THE EXECUTIVE ORDER
Among other recent Presidents who have been criticized for executive 
overreach, former President Barrack Obama embraced the unilateral power
of the Executive order to reshape the nation through sweeping regulations.551 
The Executive order replaced the legislative process and substituted law 
made by representatives of the people with law made by bureaucrats.
Arguably, this contradicted the democratic process.
Complaining about a Congress controlled by a different political party 
that resisted his agenda during a portion of his two terms, President Obama
entered 560 total Executive orders, involving significant financial and
social regulations during the first seven years of his presidency, which is 
544. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 744; BERG, supra note 3, at 291; Berchtold, supra
note 5, at 438, 441. 
545. Berchtold, supra note 5, at 441.
 546. Id.
 547. See Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 764.
548. Following two years of proven service by the airlines, Postmaster General Brown
exchanged the airmail contracts for airmail certificates pursuant to the McNary-Watres 
statutory language.  See generally id. at 654–76. 
549. See id. at 682. 
550. Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 256 (1907) (quoting Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 
U.S. 97, 107 (1878) (Bradley, J., concurring)). 
551. Binyamin Appelbaum & Michael D. Shear, Once Skeptical of Executive Power,
Obama Has Come to Embrace It, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/08/14/us/politics/obama-era-legacy-regulation.html [https://perma.cc/QJT4-FHDH]. 
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50% higher in number than his immediate predecessor.552  For example,
an executive agency during the Obama presidency awarded “‘lawful status’ 
on at least 4.3 million illegal aliens,” a move contrary to the congressional 
intent.553 
As reflected in more recent events, these intragovernmental battles 
spilled into the courts. Today, there is increasing evidence of the rising
tension between different branches of government as they battle over
partisan economic priorities, the scope of the social service net, and, most
notably, the budget.  In January 2019, the longest government shutdown
in the country’s history ended with President Trump unable to secure 
significant congressional funding for a border wall necessary for national
security reasons.554  Undeterred, President Trump declared a national emergency 
and proposed transferring money from other federal budgetary sources, 
including the federal asset forfeiture fund, the military construction fund, 
and the military antidrug account to subsidize this endeavor.555  Critics 
argued the Presidential action was contrary to congressional intent,556 potentially
triggered a dangerous precedent for future Presidents, and possibly disrupted 
the balance of power between two branches of government.557 
Even Congress responded.  Citing the constitutional significance of
separation of powers, Congress passed a joint resolution558 opposing the
552. Id.
 553. Erin Ha
-
wley, Obama’s Curtain Call: A Look Back on a Legacy of Executive 
Overreach, HILL (Dec. 24, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/the
administration/311608-obamas-curtain-call-a-look-back-on-a-legacy-of [https://perma.cc/ 
6W45-7VLX].
554. Associated Press, Trump Says ‘Wall’ Must Be Part of Lawmakers’ Border Deal, 
KPBS (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.kpbs.org/news/2019/jan/30/trump-says-wall-must-be-
part-lawmakers-border-deal [https://perma.cc/JVW4-PTTL].
555. Charlie Savage & Robert Pear, 16 States Sue to Stop Trump’s Use of Emergency 
Powers to Build Border Wall, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/ 
18/us/politics/national-emergency-lawsuits-trump.html [https://perma.cc/BUJ6-WXPD]. 
556. See, e.g., Alan Fram, Democrats Prepare Resolution Against Trump’s Declaration, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/f959b48ccf00424ead5097 
ee01877456 [https://perma.cc/2U2Z-7GAV].
557. See Peter Baker, Emily Cochrane & Maggie Haberman, As Congress Passes
Spending Bill, Trump Plans National Emergency to Build Border Wall, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/14/us/politics/trump-national-emergency-
border.html [https://perma.cc/L7CD-QPK3].
558. Originally, the National Emergencies Act of 1976 empowered Congress to 
terminate a national emergency following a resolution passed in both houses.  See generally 
National Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 50 U.S.C. (2012)).  Interestingly, subsequent executive administrations 
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use of a national emergency as a vehicle to shift funding for border
security.559  On March 15, 2019, President Trump vetoed this legislative
initiative for attempting to block his funding maneuver as allowed by 
statute.560  Considering Congress lacked the votes to overcome the
Presidential veto, the President could successfully steer funding to border 
security contrary to the congressional budget allocation.561  Now, Congress
is considering future legislation that limits the use of the national emergency, 
hoping to curb executive power.562 
Similarly, some Presidential critics challenged this recent executive
action through the courts, asserting that the Presidential initiative violated 
separation of powers.563  On May 30, 2019, a federal district court judge
in Oakland, California, issued an injunction preventing the Trump administration 
from transferring the Department of Defense funding dedicated for 
combatting illegal drugs to building a border wall.564  A coalition of groups
filed the action, asserting Congress did not authorize this particular $2.5 
billion Pentagon earmark for constructing a border wall and the administration’s 
effort to redirect the funding violated separation of powers.565  On July 26,
2019, however, the U.S. Supreme Court nullified the lower court injunction 
and—at least momentarily—allowed the Trump administration to fund 
complained that this legislative power resembled a “legislative veto,” which violated
separation of powers. See Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 273, 273 (1993).  The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the legislative
veto was unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha. 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).  The Court’s 
holding prompted the law to change, allowing Congress to terminate a national emergency 
declaration only after passing a joint resolution, which required Presidential signature. 
See Savage & Pear, supra note 555. 
559. Fram, supra note 556; Carl Hulse, After Veto, Some Lawmakers See a New 
Emergency: Fixing the Act Trump Invoked, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2019), https://www.
nytimes.com/2019/03/16/us/politics/trump-veto-emergency-act.html [https://perma.cc/
BWK7-DBJ8]; Paul Owen, Senate Set to Reject Trump’s National Emergency Declaration,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 5, 2019, 5:45 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/mar/05/
senate-to-reject-trump-national-emergency-declaration [https://perma.cc/KTS8-9RPX]. 
560. Hulse, supra note 559. 
561. Id. 
562. Id.; see National Emergencies Act, 90 Stat. 1255. 
563.  Savage & Pear, supra note 555. 
564. Lawrence Hurley, U.S. Supreme Court Lets Trump Use Disputed Funds for 
Border Wall, REUTERS (July 26, 2019, 3:36 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
court-wall-idUSKCN1UL2S7 [https://perma.cc/6TH5-KYE3].
565. Sierra Club v. Trump, 929 F.3d 670, 676 (9th Cir. 2019).  The coalition filing
the suit is the Southern Border Communities Coalition group, which includes a variety of 
groups claiming to advocate on behalf of individuals residing near the border and the Sierra 
Club. Id.  The longtime environmental organization fears the proposed wall jeopardizes 
the habitat for a variety of species living in the southern United States and northern Mexico 
area.  Hurley, supra note 564. 
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the wall as proposed after finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to file 
the lawsuit.566 
Additionally, sixteen states, including California, New York, Hawaii, 
and Oregon, pursued legal action against the President in the same federal 
district court, claiming he lacked the authority to divert funding when
spending is a congressional responsibility.567  Despite the chorus of multiple, 
heated accusations condemning the funding maneuver, existing congressional 
legislation allowed this executive action.568 Equally significant, the statutory 
language only broadly defined the scope of a national emergency and did 
not specify any prerequisites prior to an Executive declaration.569 
Trump’s decision to act pursuant to congressional statute is distinguishable 
from Roosevelt’s conduct involving the Air Mail Affair.  While Roosevelt 
and his administration purported to act under statutory authority, the New 
Deal era President flagrantly ignored the written notice and forty-five-day
hearing requirements both specified in the airline contracts as well as
contained in the congressionally enacted McNary-Watres Act.570  While
the former President clung to § 3950 as justifying his conduct, at least one 
federal court concluded that even this statute implied a notice and hearing 
requirement.571  Roosevelt provided neither. Future Executives must resist
exceeding their authority and resist usurping the authority of another branch 
of government, all conduct that threatens constitutional democracy. 
566. Hurley, supra note 564. 
567. California v. Trump, 379 F. Supp. 3d 928, 935–36, 941 (N.D. Cal. 2019).  On 
June 19, the court allowed the U.S. House of Representatives leave to file an amicus curiae 
brief, ostensibly supporting the multiple state initiated legal action.  Order Granting Consent 
Motion for Leave to File Memorandum of the United States House of Representatives as 
Amicus Curiae, Trump, 379 F. Supp. 3d 928 (No. 19-cv-00872-HSG).  Also filing lawsuits in 
opposition to the executive action, the watchdog group Public Citizen as well as the Center 
for Biological Diversity, Defenders of Wildlife, and the Animal Legal Defense Fund were 
all pursuing relief in the courts.  Savage & Pear, supra note 555. 
568. National Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No. 94-412, §§ 201, 301, 90 Stat. 1255, 
1255, 1257 (1976) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1621, 1631 (2012)). 
569. See Savage & Pear, supra note 555; see also National Emergencies Act §§ 201, 301,
90 Stat. at 1255, 1257.  The Act simply required the President to specify the legal 
provision authorizing executive action and notify Congress of the declaration.  National 
Emergencies Act § 301, 90 Stat. at 1257. 
570. Pac. Air Transp. v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 649, 656 (1942) (quoting McNary-Watres 
Act, ch. 223, sec. 2, § 6, 46 Stat. 259, 260 (1930)). 
571.  Boeing Air Transp., Inc. v. Farley, 75 F.2d 765, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1935). 
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President Roosevelt violated both separation of powers and due process 
when taking the air carrier’s five route certificates. Roosevelt was
bolstered by several factors.  Specifically, the Black committee concluded
that the airmail contracts were fraudulently obtained,572 the Postal Solicitor 
recommended cancellation,573 and public opinion was inflamed.  Regardless, 
he exceeded his Presidential authority. 
The Constitution empowers Congress to “establish Post Offices and
post Roads”574 and oversee mail handling.575  Here, Congress fulfilled its
role as entrusted by the Constitution.  Pursuant to McNary-Watres legislation 
signed April 29, 1930, the Postmaster General could exchange a mail carrier’s 
contract for an air certificate for up to ten years from the date of the 
original contract and following two years of satisfactory service.576 Under
this legislation, Congress further restructured the payment schedule when 
endorsing Brown’s space-weight method over the previous method.577 
Instead of compensating carriers for the weight amount of mail transported, 
the carriers were compensated for the amount of transportation space
available, allowing them to carry passengers.578  Further, this legislation 
authorized the Postmaster General to award extensions or consolidate 
579 routes when in the public interest.
While Congress conferred some responsibility for mail service to the 
Postmaster General, it never transferred this constitutionally prescribed 
function to the executive branch.580  But arguing executive action was 
necessary, President Roosevelt directed the contract annulment anyway, 
asserting authority over the responsibilities prescribed to a separate branch of 
government.581 
After participating in a conference at the White House582 Postmaster
General Farley technically announced the annulment under Order No. 
4959 issued February 9, 1934;583 however, this was undeniably President
Roosevelt’s decision. On the same day, the President issued Executive Order 
572. BLACK, supra note 11, at 321. 
573. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 747–48. 
574. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7. 
575. Boeing Air Transp., 75 F.2d at 768. 
576.  McNary-Watres Act, ch. 223, sec. 2, § 6, 46 Stat. 259, 259–60 (1930). 
577. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 690, 769–71 (quoting McNary-Watres Act, 46
Stat. at 259).
578. Id. at 769. 
579.  McNary-Watres Act, sec. 2, § 6, 46 Stat. at 259–60. 
580. See id. at 259. 
581. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 748. 
582. Berchtold, supra note 5, at 443. 
583. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 744. 
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6591, directing the Air Corps to transport the mail as well as instructing
both the commerce and war departments to assist with this effort by
providing equipment, land, and even employees.584  Further, Roosevelt
chose the air carrier’s final day transporting the mail as February 19 after 
overruling the Postmaster General who requested postponing this event 
until early June.585  Even the media described this as Roosevelt’s decision 
with The Washington Post reporting that “President Roosevelt yesterday 
directed the cancellation of all air mail contracts.”586 
Arguments concerning one branch of government intruding on the 
duties of another branch of government are closely scrutinized by the 
Supreme Court. At this time in history, the Supreme Court repeatedly
struck down both legislative and executive attempts to transfer legislative
powers to the executive branch, finding these attempts unconstitutional.587 
The postal duty is a responsibility delegated to Congress by the 
Constitution588 and when Roosevelt acted, he lacked congressional 
authorization.589  Likewise, when proceeding against the air carriers under
§ 3950 Roosevelt denied the Pacific Air plaintiffs an opportunity to be 
heard, which at least one court described as unconstitutional.590  For these
reasons, the Pacific Air court was justified in deciding differently. 
Applying the relevant case law, and the applicable statutes, and after
considering the commentary following the Air Mail Affair, both President
Roosevelt and Postmaster Farley should have reacted differently, even if
intent on responding to the concerns voiced in the Black commission
proceedings.  First, Roosevelt should have resisted inserting himself into 
the Air Mail Affair, thus preventing any criticisms about intruding, tainting 
the outcome, and assuming a responsibility delegated to Congress. The 
air certificates were agreements between the carriers and the Postmaster
General, not the President.  By overreaching, he exceeded his authority and
affected the outcome. His conduct prompted drastic consequences.  He 
584. Exec. Order No. 6591: The Army Temporarily Flies the Mail, 3 PUB. PAPERS
93, 93 (Feb. 9, 1934). 
585. BLACK, supra note 11, at 321; Werrell, supra note 10, at 15. 
586. Dure, supra note 125, at A1. 
587. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 296–97 (1936); A.L.A. 
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935); Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 
293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935). 
588. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7. 
589. See Exec. Order No. 6591, 3 PUB. PAPERS at 93. 
590. E.g., Boeing Air Transp., Inc. v. Farley, 75 F.2d 765, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1935). 
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replaced commercial aviation with the public sector, which was unprepared 
for this responsibility.
Second, Postmaster Farley should have demonstrated a proper, measured, 
and proportionate response to the issue. Following an objective review of
the credible evidence, he should have moved to identify the carriers actually 
deserving of contract cancellation, sanction, or less drastic action instead
of revoking all the contracts affecting more than thirty carriers and
condemning the entire industry, as Lindbergh asserted.591  By moving 
against all the carriers, not just those implicated of wrongdoing, the Postmaster 
General threatened the viability of the emerging aviation industry. Failing 
to recognize that his action prompted consequences, the Postmaster General 
must appreciate his decision invited ripple effects within the industry, 
quite possibly even extending into the broader economy. 
Third, the Postmaster General should have proceeded under an appropriate
legal cause of action, not § 3950, which denied Fifth Amendment due
process rights.592  Instead, he should have acted under a breach of contract 
claim, thus providing the affected carriers with the written notice and 
opportunity to be heard pursuant to their agreement.593  This is a more fair 
and equitable course of action than proceeding against the implicated air 
carriers under a statute that does not afford them an opportunity to respond 
to a unilateral decision affecting a significant property interest. 
X. CONCLUSION
The airmail certificates were negotiated between the Postmaster General 
and the separate air carriers, yet Roosevelt directed the outcome.  He abolished 
the agreements, thrusted airmail delivery on an ill-equipped and unprepared
Air Corps., and then reversed himself following tragic consequences.  Among
other criticisms, the Black commission and the Roosevelt administration
philosophically disliked the fee structure and the subsidies enacted in
McNary-Watres.594  However, this legislation was “deliberately designed
to build up an air transport system of financially sound and experienced 
companies which would . . . become self-supporting.”595 Emboldened by
the new 1930 legislation, Brown embraced the challenge to improve the 
air transportation system and grow the economy, aiming to both eliminate 
irresponsible carriers while consolidating the numerous smaller air carriers 
591. Libby, supra note 18, at 45. 
592. See Boeing Air Transp., 75 F.2d at 767. 
593. See Pac. Air Transp. v. United States, 98 Ct. Cl. 649, 656 (1942) (quoting
McNary-Watres Act, ch. 223, sec. 2, § 6, 46 Stat. 259, 260 (1930)). 
594. Special Committee to Investigate Air Mail and Ocean Mail Contracts, supra
note 276. 
595. Berchtold, supra note 5, at 445.
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into larger, more efficient, financially secure carriers capable of providing
a quality product.596 
Unsurprisingly, Brown’s detractors criticized his decision-making when 
he encouraged different carriers to merge, but this is exactly the same kind 
of strategic move that occurred in a different transportation industry. About 
this time, the Interstate Commerce Commission forced “the consolidation of
railroads into a few major systems.”597  Even when deciding against the 
airlines in his concurring opinion, Judge John Marvin Jones recognized 
the challenging circumstances facing the individuals involved in the Air 
Mail Affair: “This was a great new industry in which the country was vitally 
interested. Its development was fraught with risks and losses and called 
for daring as well as vision.”598  Although Roosevelt, the Black committee,
and others impugned Brown and the air carriers, Commissioner Akers at 
least was very clear when finding the former Postmaster General acted 
within the law.599 
Of course, any conduct violating the public trust is indefensible. Steering 
contracts, committing fraud, and conspiring against a competitive bidding 
process are as misguided as the government disregarding due process of
law. When acting arbitrarily and unjustly,600 the government undermines
people’s faith in the judicial system and shakes their confidence in the 
foundation of government. 
Lindbergh’s concerns about a government exceeding its authority and 
failing to follow our established laws remain relevant today.  As we move
forward, a government functioning outside the constitutional framework
will create future challenges, present potential pitfalls, and test our resolve 
to ensure the different branches operate within the scope of their respective
responsibilities.  Among other observations, the courts must remain attentive 
to these issues surfacing on the horizon.  Further, future Executives and 
government agencies need to resist exceeding their constitutional authority 
influenced by ideological leanings and defer to the experience of the 
596. Rubin, supra note 6, at 570–71. 
597. Berchtold, supra note 5, at 440. 
598. Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. at 793 (Jones, J., concurring). 
599. After hearing over sixty-three days of evidence on this matter, the Commissioner
did not find that Brown acted improperly.  Godehn & Quindry, supra note 15, at 259–60, 
271.  In fact, Commissioner Akers found that these contracts were awarded following
proper competitive bidding procedures, and the evidence failed to corroborate the government’s 
assertion that plaintiff airlines received contracts through fraud or collusion.  Id. at 271. 
600. Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 256 (1907) (citing Davidson v. New Orleans, 
96 U.S. 97, 107 (1878) (Bradley, J., concurring)). 
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legislature when applicable.  Conversely, the legislature needs to resist 
transferring too much authority and responsibility to executive agencies
and disallow ideological opinions to shape this decision-making.
Among other lessons, the Air Mail Affair encourages deference to
legislative expertise, somewhat similar to the court deferring to legal precedent. 
When Roosevelt abruptly entered his Executive order, Congress had a 
lengthy history studying the aviation industry.  Roosevelt substituted his 
limited exposure to the airmail issue with the experience of numerous 
individuals, serving multiple terms, while studying this evolving industry
and benefiting from a broad range of information including congressional
testimony.601  Acting on this knowledge, Congress passed multiple pieces 
of legislation as early as 1916 through McNary-Watres in 1930.602 
This challenge will not disappear as future officeholders interpret their 
duties more broadly than others, pushing the boundaries of their constitutional
roles.  The courts must remain vigilant.  Undoubtedly, judicial interpretation 
is necessary to decide if future Executives and legislative bodies are migrating 
onto the terrain of another branch of government. The Constitution entrusts
the judiciary with performing their duty independently, considering the 
plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language and following the 
law consistently.  To do less is a disservice to constitutional democracy.
The Air Mail Affair signaled one of the first disputes over the scope of 
government during the Roosevelt administration, as those favoring a free 
market economy battled those advancing the President’s New Deal legislation. 
It also signaled the first confrontation between Lindbergh and Roosevelt 
with Lindbergh advocating for an economy shaped by independent, free 
market forces and the President insisting government had an obligation to
impose limits on the free market to advance the general welfare of all 
citizens.603  As a harbinger of things to come, this epic encounter between 
two iconic figures set the stage for an ongoing debate about the evolving 
New Deal legislation, the reach of an expanding government, and the 
impact on future generations.
Much like his steady, resolute Spirit of St. Louis single-engine airplane
traveling the width of the Atlantic,604 Lindbergh did not stray from his
mission. He openly defied Roosevelt because the former aviator was troubled 
by a government disregarding fundamental elements of the law, exceeding 
601. See Berchtold, supra note 5, at 446. 
602. See id. at 438–39, 445–47.  The post office initially requested funding for the 
airmail service in 1912, but Congress did not approve it until 1916.  Pac. Air Transp., 98 Ct. Cl. 
at 677.  On May 15, 1918, Congress approved funding for the first experimental airmail route 
between New York and Washington, D.C.  Id. 
 603. See BERG, supra note 3, at 291–92, 295–96. 
604. The Flight, supra note 1. 
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its executive authority, and intruding on industry.605  When President Roosevelt 
canceled the contracts, he unfairly condemned the commercial aviation 
industry that had developed the best air transportation system in the world.606 
His misguided action caused economic damage that almost triggered “the 
demise of the airline industry.”607 
When speaking out against government overreach, Lindbergh advocated 
for a government constrained by the Constitution, as well as for a business 
environment conducive to creativity, development, and innovation.  The 
country’s democracy, system of governance, and even the rule of law depends 
upon honoring the Constitution.  When disregarding the Constitution, the
system fails. Thomas Jefferson recognized the significance of separation 
of powers and strongly advocated for a government of limited powers 
when he wrote: “[I]t is the duty of the general government to guard its
subordinate members from the encroachments of each other, even when
they are made through error or inadvertence, and to cover its citizens from 
the exercise of powers not authorized by the law.”608 
605. JAMES P. DUFFY, LINDBERGH VS. ROOSEVELT: THE RIVALRY THAT DIVIDED AMERICA
16–17 (2010).
606. Lindbergh asserted that “the United States . . .  is far in the lead in almost every
branch of commercial aviation.”  Libby, supra note 18, at 45.  Others corroborated Lindbergh’s 
claim.  Kenneth P. Werrell asserts that the “American air transport[ation] and the air mail 
system [were] the envy of the world” at this time in history.  Werrell, supra note 10, at 15.  
Likewise, a European aviation periodical concluded, ‘“No other country can show as high 
a standard of speed, regularity and safety’ as the American airmail system.”  Id. (quoting 
Briton Lauds U.S. Air Mail Service, WASH. POST, Apr. 22, 1934, at AS10). 
607. Michael A. Katz, The American Experience Under the Airline Deregulation Act
of 1978—An Airline Perspective, 6 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 87, 87 (1988). 
608. THOMAS JEFFERSON, Opinion on Certain Proceedings of the Executive in the 
Northwestern Territory, in 3 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 88, 88 (Albert Ellery 
Bergh ed., 1907). 
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